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UN PROFIL UML MODULAIRE SELON LE NIVEAU D’ASSURANCE
LOGICIELLE POUR LE SUPPORT DE DO-178C
Nicolas Metayer
RÉSUMÉ
Plusieurs approches basées sur les modèles ont été proposées pour faciliter le développement de
logiciel critique certiﬁable. Dans ce mémoire, nous nous intéressons aux logiciels avioniques
devant se conformer au standard DO-178C. Cependant, les approches existantes ne supportent
pas entièrement les activités du cycle de vie logiciel déﬁni par DO-178C.
Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons un proﬁl UML capturant les concepts de DO-178C ainsi que
ses suppléments aﬁn de modéliser les évidences exigés pour la certiﬁcation. Ce proﬁle fournit
des éléments de modélisation pour déﬁnir un cycle de vie logiciel conforme à DO-178C, pour
spéciﬁer des exigences logicielles et des données de vériﬁcation, ainsi que pour spéciﬁer la
traçabilité demandée par DO-178C. De plus, ce proﬁl à l’unique caractéristique de fournir un
moyen de spéciﬁer les objectifs et activités à effectuer durant le cycle de vie logiciel selon le
niveau d’assurance logiciel visée ainsi que des suppléments à DO-178C utilisés.
Nous avons implémenté the proﬁl proposé au sein de Papyrus, un environnement de modélisation
pour UML. Nous avons utilisé le proﬁl pour modéliser un exemple réaliste de logiciel avionique.
En particulier, nous avons illustré l’utilisation de ce proﬁle à travers quatre cas d’utilisation.
Mots-clés: Logiciel avionique, certiﬁcation logiciel, DO-178C, Ingénierie dirigée par les
modèles, Langage de modélisation dédié, Proﬁl UML

AN ASSURANCE LEVEL SENSITIVE UML PROFILE FOR SUPPORTING DO-178C
Nicolas Metayer
ABSTRACT
Several model-based approaches have been proposed to ease the process of developing certiﬁable
safety-critical software. In this thesis, we are interested in airborne software which must comply
with DO-178C standard. However, existing approaches do not provide complete support for all
the activities of the software life cycle as deﬁned by DO-178C.
In this thesis, we propose an UML proﬁle that captures the concepts of DO-178C and its supple-
ments in order to model the evidence required for certiﬁcation. This proﬁle provides modeling
constructs for the deﬁnition of a DO-178C compliant software life cycle, the speciﬁcation of the
software requirements, the speciﬁcation of veriﬁcation data and ﬁnally the speciﬁcation of the
traceability that is requested by DO-178C. Furthermore, this proﬁle has the unique feature of
providing means to specify the objectives and activities to be performed throughout the software
life cycle depending on the targeted assurance level and applied DO-178C supplements.
We implemented the proposed proﬁle within Papyrus, an UML modeling environment. We used
the proﬁle to model a realistic example of airborne software. Speciﬁcally, we illustrated the
usefulness of the proﬁle through four use cases.
Keywords: Airborne software, software certiﬁcation, DO-178C, model-driven engineering,
domain speciﬁc modeling language, UML proﬁle
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INTRODUCTION
Research context
Safety-critical systems are more and more relying on software. Among these systems, avionics
are increasingly depending on software to control their behaviors (Huhn & Hungar, 2007; Pettit
et al., 2014). Because failure in aircraft systems could result in multiple fatalities, a high-level of
conﬁdence in the ability to operate safely an aircraft is required (Marques et al., 2012; Gallina &
Andrews, 2016 ). As such, safety is one of the major concerns in the avionic domain. Although
safety is considered to be a problem related to physical systems, software can contribute to
hazards (Heimdahl, 2007; Rushby, 2007). Such hazards are the result of erroneous control of
the system by the software. Demonstrating that an airborne software complies with its assigned
level of safety is not a trivial process.
To ensure that the necessary safety evidence, deﬁned by Nair et al. (2014) as «artifacts that
contribute to developing conﬁdence in the safe operation of a system» are provided, the activities
related to the development of airborne software are strongly regulated (Nejati et al., 2014).
Such regulation exists to guide and, in some cases, to enforce certain practices related to
software engineering in order to gain the required conﬁdence in the safety of the produced
software. Regulations that apply to airborne software development include DO-178, Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certiﬁcation.
Initially released in 1982, DO-178 has been developed to provide the industry with guidelines
for developing airborne software to satisfy the airworthiness requirements. Guidelines offered
by DO-178 do not prescribe how the software development should be performed (Rushby, 2007).
However the guidelines specify which activities should be performed and documents should be
produced. As for many domains, software engineering methodologies are evolving. To keep
pace with such changes and allow the industry to beneﬁt from these new methodologies, the
regulation corpus evolves. Although happening at a slow rate, multiple revisions of DO-178
2were developed since its initial release. DO-178A in 1985, DO-178B in 1992 and ﬁnally
DO-178C in 2011 (RTCA, 2011). This latest revision removes some ambiguities found in
DO-178B guidelines and provides additional guidelines in the form of supplements addressing
new software development technologies (i.e. object-oriented programming, formal methods).
These supplements are DO-331 (RTCA, 2011c) for model-based development and veriﬁcation,
DO-332 (RTCA, 2011d) for object-oriented technologies and DO-333 (RTCA, 2011e) for the
use of formal methods. Furthermore, tool qualiﬁcation guidelines are provided by DO-330
(RTCA, 2011b). As the release of DO-178C is still fairly recent, the industry still needs to adapt
their development practices to beneﬁt from the use of the technologies that are addressed by the
supplements.
Among the recent development made in software engineering technologies, industrials are
particularly interested in approaches that use model-driven engineering (MDE) methodology.
MDE is a software engineering approach that aims at alleviating the complexity of software
development through the use of domain speciﬁc models and transformations that support the
reﬁnement of these models into artifacts (Schmidt, 2006).
Research problem statement
Development activities of airborne software are guided by DO-178C and its supplements. The
scope of the guidelines covers the complete software development life cycle. The software life
cycle, as deﬁned by DO-178C, is comprised of a set of processes that are determined by an
organization to be sufﬁcient and adequate for the development of the software product according
to the criticality of the software. The software life cycle begins when the decision to produce
the software is made and ends when the product is retired from service.
Prior to actually develop the software, planning of activities constituting the software life cycle
shall be performed. Thus, in the context of DO-178C, the planning process is the ﬁrst process
3to be carried out. The planning process is an important process as it deﬁnes the activities
to be performed to produce the software and it describes all the data that will be produced;
these data will serve as evidence for certiﬁcation. The planning process produces a number
of plans including the Plan for Software Aspects of Certiﬁcation (PSAC) which has to be
submitted ﬁrst to the certifying authorities. Only on approval of the PSAC can the software
development activities begin. Hence, the PSAC must demonstrate that the proposed software
life cycle is compliant with DO-178C. However most existing model-driven approaches that
support the development of airborne software according to DO-178C do not offer any support
to automatically create the PSAC and all the plans that need to be produced during the planning
process depending on the criticality level of the software.
Once the PSAC is approved by the certifying authorities, the actual process of developing the
software can begin. Both the software development and veriﬁcation processes can start. Soft-
ware development processes include requirements speciﬁcation, design, coding and integration
activities. Specifying requirement involves the development of high-level requirements (HLRs)
from the system requirements allocated to software (SRATS) while design involves the develop-
ment of the low-level requirements (LLRs) and the software architecture from the high-level
requirements. The software veriﬁcation process consists in carrying out a number of tests,
reviews and analyses. Thus data produced by this process include test cases, test procedures,
test execution results, reviews and analyses speciﬁcations, and reviews and analyses results. To
comply with DO-178C, we need to explicitly establish traceability between the requirements
and the veriﬁcation data. Moreover, we need to trace both LLRs and software architecture to
HLRs. The traceability must be established both forward and backward. Flaws in the traceability
of the artifacts produced during the software life cycle result in major non-compliance issues
(Nejati et al. 2012) that impede the certiﬁcation of the software.
4Existing model-driven approaches that support DO-178C focused on the software requirements
process and software design process (Zoughbi et al., 2010; WU et al., 2015) and the software
veriﬁcation process (Stallbaum & Rzepka, 2010). These approaches do not model the DO-178
standard. The RAF meta-model (De la Vara et al., 2016) is an exception as it is built from
a number of standards, including DO-178C. However it uses a uniﬁed vocabulary that is not
speciﬁc to DO-178C. Moreover, the existing approaches do not tackle the assurance level
modularity introduced by DO-178. As a result these approaches do not consider the variations
in the compliance needs to be provided in order to achieve certiﬁcation.
Thesis organization
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 1, we provide an introduction
to DO-178C and we discuss the existing works related to the development of safety-critical
systems using a model-based engineering methodology. Chapter 2 introduces our research
objectives and describes the proposed approach along with the methodology that guided our
work. Chapter 3 provides the description of our conceptual model of DO-178C. Chapter 4
describes the proposed UML proﬁle for DO-178C. Chapter 5 describes the integration of our
proﬁle within an open-source UML modeling tool and demonstrates the use of the proposed
proﬁle through 4 use cases by modeling a landing gear control software. Finally, we conclude
our thesis, introduce the limitations we faced and provide possible future work to extend our
approach.
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we introduce key concepts related to this thesis and discuss relevant existing
approaches. In Section 1.1, we ﬁrst give an overview of DO-178C and its needs toward achieving
software certiﬁcation. We also provide in Section 1.2, an overview of the MDE methodology
and domain-speciﬁc modeling. In particular, we describe the uniﬁed modeling language and
its proﬁle extension mechanism. In section 1.3, we present relevant existing approaches for
modeling safety critical systems. Finally, in Section 1.4 we discuss the ﬁndings of the previous
sections and highlight the limitations of the existing work.
1.1 DO-178C
DO-178, "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certiﬁcation" (RTCA,
2011a) is the de-facto safety standard used to drive the development activities of airborne
software systems. Its purpose is to provide guidance for the development of software products in
respect of the airworthiness requirements assigned to the software. The rigor of the airworthiness
requirements assigned to a software product is dependent on the product’s associated criticality.
To address the different levels of criticality deﬁned at the system level, the guidelines prescribed
by DO-178 are organized in a modular manner. To provide such modularity, the standard
deﬁnes ﬁve software levels, often referred to as design assurance level (DAL) or assurance level
(Rushby, 2011). These assurance levels are mapped to the following failure condition categories
that are deﬁned in the Federal Aviation Administration’s Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309 (FAA,
1988):
• Catastrophic: Deﬁnes failure conditions that would usually lead to the loss of the aircraft,
thus leading to multiple casualties.
• Hazardous: Deﬁnes failure conditions that lead to the reduction of the ability to operate
the aircraft within acceptable safety margins. Such failure conditions could result in 1)
6an important decrease in the functional capabilities of the airplane, 2) physical agony or
increase of the aircraft operating crew workload, resulting in the loss of the ability for the
crew to perform their tasks as intended or to perform them at all, or 3) severe injuries or
fatalities inﬂicted to a small number of passengers other than the ﬂight crew.
• Major: Deﬁnes failure conditions that lead to a reduction of ability of the aircraft or its
operating crew to deal with unexpected operating conditions. Such failure conditions would
result in 1) a reduction of the functional capabilities or safety margins of the aircraft, 2)
an increased workload for the crew or conditions that hinder its efﬁciency, or 3) physical
distress to passengers or crew members with possible injuries.
• Minor: Deﬁnes failure conditions that would not lead to an important reduction of the
aircraft safety. However such conditions involve a small increase of the crew workload that
remains well within its capabilities.
• No safety effect: Deﬁnes failure conditions that do not have an impact on safety. Such
failures do not impact the operational capabilities of the aircraft nor the aircraft operating
crew workload.
DO-178 deﬁnes software levels that map to the above described failure conditions as follows:
• Level A : Deﬁnes software whose undesired behavior, as outlined by the safety assessment
process, would be contributing to or resulting in a system malfunction whose consequence
would result in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft.
• Level B: Deﬁnes software whose undesired behavior, as outlined by the safety assessment
process, would be contributing to or causing a system malfunction whose consequence
would result in an hazardous failure condition for the aircraft.
• Level C: Deﬁnes software whose undesired behavior, as outlined by the safety assessment
process, would be contributing to or causing a system malfunction whose consequence
would result in a major failure condition for the aircraft.
7• Level D: Deﬁnes software whose undesired behavior, as outlined by the safety assessment
process, would be contributing to or causing a system malfunction whose consequence
would result in a minor failure condition for the aircraft.
• Level E: Deﬁnes software whose undesired behavior, as outlined by the safety assessment
process, would be contributing to or causing a system malfunction that would have no
impact on the aircraft.
DO-178 software levels are used to guide an applicant, i.e. an organization that applies for the
certiﬁcation of its software product, in the deﬁnition of the software life cycle to be applied to
develop the software product. Applicants are guided in terms of activities to be performed and
objectives to be achieved during the software life cycle. The number of activities and objectives
is dependent on the software level assigned to a software product. In its latest revision, DO-178C
which has been published in 2011 to address identiﬁed issues in the text of its predecessor
(DO-178B), the number of objectives to be achieved ranges from 26 for software level D to 71
for software level A.
Applicants are not forced to follow DO-178C to show compliance with the applicable airworthi-
ness regulation affecting software in airborne systems (FAA, 2013). Other means of compliance
can be used by an applicant if an appropriate level of assurance can be demonstrated for the
software product. However it is strongly recommended to follow the workﬂow prescribed
by DO-178C in order to demonstrate that a product complies with its assigned airworthiness
requirements. In fact DO-178C prescribes a software life cycle that is decomposed into a set of
processes as depicted in Figure 1.1. These processes are the following:
• The software planning process in charge of deﬁning and coordinating the activities driving
the development and integral processes.
• The software development processes in charge of the production of the software product.
Such processes include the software requirements process, the software design process, the
software coding process and the integration process.
8Figure 1.1 DO-178 processes.
• The integral processes in charge of ensuring the correctness and control of, and conﬁdence
in the software life cycle processes and their outputs. Such processes include the software
veriﬁcation process, the software conﬁguration management process, the software quality
assurance process, and the certiﬁcation liaison process. These processes should be performed
in concurrence with the planning and development processes throughout the software life
cycle.
Figure 1.2 offers an overview of the workﬂow to be conducted during the software development
processes and the software veriﬁcation process. The development of DO-178C compliant soft-
ware begins with the deﬁnition of the high-level requirements (HLRs), obtained by reﬁnement
of the system requirements allocated to software 1. Review and analysis of the HLRs are then
conducted to assess the various properties they must exhibit such as HLRs consistency and
1 The deﬁnition of the system requirements allocated to software is out of the scope of DO-178
guidelines.
9compliance with the system requirements allocated to software, their capabilities to be veriﬁed,
and that appropriate justiﬁcation is provided when necessary. With the HLRs validated, the soft-
ware design process can be initiated leading to the development of the low-level requirements
(LLRs) and the software architecture by reﬁnement of the HLRs. The LLRs are assessed by
combination of review, analysis and test cases to ensure that the developed product complies
with its high-level requirements.
In DO-178C, the current version of the standard, few modiﬁcations have been made to the core
document. Theses modiﬁcations were developed with the objective of maintaining backward
compatibility with DO-178B and they mainly aim at ﬁxing errors, inconsistencies and using a
more consistent terminology. The most notable change lies in the introduction of supplements
to address issues related to the use of new software development technologies that were not
addressed at the time of DO-178B release. The supplementary documents cannot be used as
standalone documents, therefore they must be used as additional guidelines to DO-178C. These
supplements include tool qualiﬁcation guidelines, model based development and veriﬁcation,
object oriented technologies, and formal methods. These supplements may add, delete or modify
objectives, activities and life cycle data deﬁned in DO-178C. As such, compliance with the
corresponding supplement(s) is required when one of the addressed technology is used. When
using supplements, a project’s plan for software aspects of certiﬁcation should specify which
supplements are in use and how they are intended to be used (FAA, 2013). In the following
subsections, we brieﬂy introduce each supplement and its major concepts.
1.1.1 DO-331
DO-331, model-based development and veriﬁcation supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A,
introduces guidelines pertaining to the use of model based development technologies to perform
the software development activities. A model is deﬁned by DO-331 (RTCA, 2011c) as an
abstract representation of a system aspect used to perform analysis, veriﬁcation, simulation,
code generation or a combination of these activities. Models have to be unambiguous regardless
of the level of abstraction used to capture the system in order to enable the aforementioned
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Figure 1.2 DO-178C software development and veriﬁcation workﬂow. Adapted from
(RTCA, 2011e).
activities. DO-331 distinguishes two types of models: speciﬁcation models and design models.
In the context of DO-331, a model cannot be classiﬁed as both speciﬁcation and design.
Examples of model usage scenarios within the scope of DO-178 are provided in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1 Examples of model usage. Adapted from (RTCA, 2011c).
Process generating
life cycle data
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4
Software Require-
ments and Software
Design Processes
Requirements
from which
the model is
developed
Speciﬁcation
model
Speciﬁcation
model
Design model
Design model Design model Textual de-
scription
Software Coding
Process
Source Code Source Code Source Code Source Code
Speciﬁcation models capture high-level requirements to provide an abstract representation of the
functional, performance, interface, or safety properties of a software component. Speciﬁcation
models do not capture details of the software such as internal data structures, external data ﬂow,
or internal control ﬂow. Design models capture the software low-level requirements and/or the
software architecture. Design models might capture algorithms, software components internal
data structures, and data and control ﬂow. They may be used to generate the source code.
The use of DO-331 does not relieve an applicant from performing the objectives of DO-178C.
As models represent either HLRs, LLrs and/or the software architecture, models have to be
treated in the same manner as the artifact they represent, meaning that traceability as deﬁned
in DO-178C has to be maintained when using models. Such traceability in a model based
development environment includes the traces between the source code and design models, the
traces between the design elements and their related speciﬁcation models, and the traces between
speciﬁcation models and the system requirements allocated to software.
1.1.2 DO-332
Object oriented programming paradigm has been developed in the 1950s. Although being
widely used for non-critical software development, its use for safety critical application for
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avionics software only increased recently. To address issues introduced by object oriented
technology and related techniques, the DO-332 supplement was released to provide guidance
when using such programming paradigm.
An object oriented technology is a software development methodology where the software
design is expressed using objects and their interrelationships. The technology also makes use
of techniques such as inheritance, polymorphism, overloading, type conversion, exception,
dynamic memory management and virtualization. Because object oriented technology vastly
differs from the traditional approach of procedural programing, it raises speciﬁc issues when
used in the design and implementation of software for airborne systems. These issues are
addressed by DO-332 (RTCA, 2011d).
For the software development activities for instance, DO-332 introduces compliance needs
regarding the deﬁnition of a class hierarchy deriving from the high-level requirements, the
deﬁnition of local type consistency where substitution is used, the deﬁnition of strategies related
to dynamic memory management and exception management.
In order to enable the veriﬁcation of an object oriented design, traceability as deﬁned by DO-
178C has to be maintained. In the context of DO-332, this traceability includes the development
of bi-directional traces between the requirements and the methods (of the classes) that implement
these requirements. Veriﬁcation activities for software developed following an object oriented
technology have to comply with the veriﬁcation objectives of DO-178C. DO-332 introduces
further objectives with focus on the veriﬁcation of the class hierarchy for consistency with the
high-level requirements, local type consistency wherever inheritance method overriding and
dynamic dispatch are used. Finally the guidelines provide emphasis on the veriﬁcation of the
correct implementation of the dynamic memory management strategies.
1.1.3 DO-333
Formal methods are mathematical based techniques used to specify, develop and verify aspects
of software (RTCA, 2011e). Such methods have been considered for avionic software before the
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release of DO-178B. However formal methods were not widely used at the time and DO-178B
did not provide clear guidance for their use. To provide precise guidance on the matter, DO-333
Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A introduces guidelines for applicants
using formal methods as a mean to achieve the development and veriﬁcation objectives of
DO-178C.
In the context of DO-333, a formal method is deﬁned as the combination of a formal model
and a formal analysis. A formal model, as deﬁned by DO-333, is an abstract representation of
a given aspect of a system, however such a model is deﬁned using a formal notation having a
precise and unambiguous, mathematically deﬁned syntax and semantic. A formal analysis is the
application of mathematical reasoning about a formal model to guarantee that properties, deﬁned
by the software requirements, are always satisﬁed. Formal analyses enable the automation and
exhaustive veriﬁcation of model properties. They are classiﬁed by DO-333 into three categories:
1) deductive method, 2) model checking and 3) abstract interpretation.
1.2 Model-driven engineering
Model-driven engineering (MDE) is a software engineering approach that aims at alleviating
the complexity of software development through the use of domain speciﬁc models and trans-
formations that support the reﬁnement of these models into artifacts (Schmidt, 2006). Thus an
MDE approach uses models as the main artifact of the software life cycle. Models are speciﬁed
using modeling languages. Modeling languages are deﬁned with a combination of the following
elements (Atkinson & Kuhne, 2003): I) a concrete syntax or the notation used to build the
models; II) an abstract syntax or vocabulary of concepts that are part of the language; III) a
semantic, either implicit or explicit, deﬁning the well formedness rules of the language; and IV)
a mapping between the abstract and the concrete syntax. These properties are speciﬁed by the
language meta-model.
A meta-model is a model that represents the concepts, associations, and constraints that form
the deﬁnition of a language (Atkinson, 2003). Models created using a modeling language
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are said to be in «conformance» with the modeling language’s meta-model which is in turn
in conformance with its own meta-model. Because meta-models are also models, they are
represented using a modeling language called meta-meta-model. However this way to deﬁne
meta-models introduces, in theory, an inﬁnite number of meta-meta-model deﬁnitions. To cope
with this problem, the Object Management Group (OMG) introduced a meta-modeling language
within its four-level modeling framework, the Meta-Object Facility (MOF) (OMG, 2015). MOF
is a meta modeling language for deﬁning other modeling languages, including MOF itself.
Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the four-level modeling framework introduced by the OMG.
Models at the M0 level represent entities of the real world that are to be modeled (for example
an aircraft). Models at the M1 level are the actual models (e.g. a UML state machine diagram)
that are created using the semantics and notations deﬁned at the meta-model (M2) level. The
Uniﬁed Modeling language (UML) is one of the most common modeling language of level M2
whose base meta-meta-model is MOF (M3).
Models may be used by various stakeholders to represent different concerns of a system. In this
context, models are used with two distinct objectives to reason about the system (Selic, 2007):
1) provide multiple perspectives on the system and 2) provide multiple levels of abstraction. The
former, commonly referred to as «views» are the representation of various concerns of the system.
A single view describes in details a speciﬁc concern of a system and when grouped together,
views provide the complete description of the modeled system. Regarding the abstraction levels,
models at the highest level are closer to the domain’s problem and those at the lowest level
include implementation details. Huhn & Hungar (2010) identiﬁed use cases where platform
independent models can be used when developing software related to safety-critical systems.
Models can be used at every stage of the software life cycle. These use cases are: (1) the
speciﬁcation of the software requirements, (2) the deﬁnition of the software architecture and its
evolution, (3) code generation, (4) veriﬁcation,(5) validation and (6) certiﬁcation.
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Figure 1.3 OMG’s four-level architecture. Adapted from Djuric´ et al. (2005)
1.2.1 Domain speciﬁc modeling
To face problems emerging in speciﬁc domains of application, domain speciﬁc languages have
proven their efﬁciency to overcome the complexity of software development project (Voelter et
al., 2013). In the context of model driven engineering, there is an increase in the use of domain
speciﬁc modeling languages (DSML) because they enable (Voelter et al., 2013): 1) a better
expression of the solutions to the problems faced in a particular domain of application by using
dialect and constructs pertaining to the domain, and 2) the capture of the domain knowledge,
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easing its exchange and reuse among the involved stakeholders. Examples of DSML include
Simulink, SCADE, MARTE or SysMl.
According to Selic (2007) and Lagarde et al. (2008), there exist three primary methods for
the creation of a domain speciﬁc modeling language, two of which are based on an existing
language: 1) the extension of an existing modeling language, 2) the reﬁnement of an existing
language and 3) the deﬁnition of the modeling language from scratch.
Among these methods, the reﬁnement of an existing modeling languages is the most practical
and cost effective solution to design a domain speciﬁc modeling languages (Selic, 2007). The
reason lies behind the quantity of reuse that such solution allows. Indeed, existing language
might provide an extension mechanism (i.e. UML proﬁle) and tools might provide support
for such mechanism. Finally, the reﬁnement of an existing language requires less training to
become familiar with the reﬁned language.
The extension or reﬁnement of an existing modeling language are the preferred methods among
modeling language designers due to the beneﬁt offered by these two methods. Using an existing
modeling language as a basis allows designers to beneﬁt from the knowledge revolving around
the used technology to better tackle a domain’s problem. Furthermore these two methods allow
a faster integration of new domain speciﬁc modeling languages within the development teams.
One such modeling language that allows its extension and reﬁnement is the uniﬁed modeling
language (UML). Extension is done through mechanisms provided by the language while
reﬁnement add new concepts to the language which might introduce some incompatibilities
with existing tool and environments.
1.2.2 UML and its extension mechanisms
The uniﬁed modeling language (UML) is an OMG’s standardized general purpose modeling
language. It is a de-facto modeling language used throughout the software development life
cycle: speciﬁcation, design, and documentation. UML is used in a broad range of areas such
as system, hardware, and even business process modeling. This wide usage is due to two
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reasons. The ﬁrst one is because UML is a general purpose language that enables to represent
a system using multiple views and with different levels of abstraction. The second reason is
the UML capability to be both extended and/or reﬁned for the speciﬁc needs of a domain. The
UML meta-model provides a built-in mechanism, called UML proﬁles to support the extension
approach to designing domain speciﬁc modeling language.
UML proﬁles have the advantage, compared to the reﬁnement of an existing meta-model, of
reducing the cost to develop a domain speciﬁc modeling language. In fact, a number of existing
UML modeling tools support the deﬁnition of UML proﬁles. Furthermore, the cost of training
people to use UML proﬁles is greatly reduced because software engineers are generally familiar
with UML and its proﬁle mechanism. The effort required to deﬁne the syntax and semantic
of a domain speciﬁc modeling language using the UML proﬁle mechanism is also reduced as
proﬁles have to remain consistent with the semantic deﬁned by the UML meta-model (Selic,
2007). As such a proﬁle cannot be used to deﬁne a new meta-model. Rather, the objective of
proﬁles is to offer a straightforward mechanism to adapt the UML meta-model with constructs
of a particular domain. Figure 1.4 displays the core concepts of UML proﬁles as deﬁned within
the UML meta-model.
An UML Proﬁle is a specialization of the UML Package. A proﬁle deﬁnes a number of
stereotypes which add non-standard semantics to the model elements on which they are applied.
Stereotypes are classes that extend base meta-classes. They may include properties and may
be accompanied by constraints enforcing rules that are applicable to the stereotypes. To deﬁne
such constraints, the OMG provides the Object Constraint Language (OCL) (OMG, 2014b).
Figure 1.5 provides a simpliﬁed example of an UML proﬁle for Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB).
The proﬁle deﬁnes the abstract stereotype Bean that is required to be applied to the Component
metaclass. In other words, it means that an instance of either the Entity or Session stereotype
must be applied to each instance of Component. Furthermore this proﬁle deﬁnes constraints
to verify that models are well formed. Example of such constraint include that a component
should not be generalized or specialized.
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Figure 1.4 UML meta-model: Proﬁle mechanism deﬁnition (OMG, 2015).
Figure 1.5 Example of UML proﬁle for EJB. (OMG, 2015).
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Despite being a rather simple mechanism to create domain speciﬁc modeling language, there
exist no standardized methodology to guide in the design of UML proﬁles. However study of
various proﬁles revealed an approach that is common to build an UML proﬁle. Selic (2007),
Lagarde et al. (2008) and Fuentes-Fernández & Vallecillo-Moreno (2004) describe this process
to design UML proﬁles in a similar manner. The general approach to deﬁne UML proﬁles shall
be composed of the following steps: 1) the proﬁle designer with help from domain specialist
deﬁnes the conceptual domain model, 2) the proﬁle designer realizes a transformation of the
domain’s concepts into stereotypes by mapping the domain concepts to the appropriate UML
meta-classes and 3) the proﬁle is reviewed to verify its consistency against the UML meta-model.
Figure 1.6 provides a small example of the mapping of a conceptual model into an UML proﬁle.
The conceptual model introduces concepts for a Simple Real Time System (SRTS). A Task
represents any resource that can be scheduled, it contains a reference to one Scheduler that
shall be deﬁned by its SchedulingPolicy. Furthermore a Task has an EntryPoint and has a set of
services (atomic and non atomic). The resulting proﬁle is deﬁned by creating a stereotype for
each of the deﬁned concepts. Concepts Scheduler and Task are extending the Class metaclass.
SchedulingPolicy extends the DataType metaclass. Finally, Service and EntryPoint extend the
Operation metaclass.
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a) Conceptual model
b) Proﬁle diagram
Figure 1.6 Example of the mapping of a conceptual model into a UML proﬁle. Adapted
from Lagarde et al. (2008)
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1.3 Approaches for modeling safety critical systems
Many model-based approaches have been proposed recently to support the development of
software in the context of safety-critical systems. Although our research problem is particularly
aimed at airborne software and their development according to DO-178C, we have explored
a broader range of application domains for model-based approaches, extending the scope of
our literature review to approaches pertaining to the development of safety-critical software
in general. The reason behind this wide scope, is due to the fact that safety-critical software
share similar properties and challenges independently from their domain of application such as
railway, aerospace, energy and medical devices.
Thus, we ﬁrst present the approaches that are domain-independent in Section 1.3.1. Then, we
introduce the approaches that are domain-dependent in Section 1.3.2. Speciﬁcally we introduce
UML proﬁles that target various speciﬁc safety-critical systems and those that speciﬁcally target
avionic systems.
1.3.1 Domain-independent approaches
Generally, safety compliance is not based on just one standard but a corpus of regulatory
standards. In this context, De la Vara et al. (2016) introduce the Reference Assurance Framework
(RAF) metamodel. Its purpose is to express key concepts and relations used for demonstrating
safety compliance that are extracted from multiple sources (i.e. safety standards, speciﬁc domain
recommended practices, and company speciﬁc practices). The RAF meta-model provides an
uniﬁed mean to create models used for safety assurance and certiﬁcation. An excerpt of
a RAF model for IEC 61508 is provided in Figure 1.7 and depicts the use of some of the
main concepts of the RAF meta-model. Among these concepts, ReferenceRequirement
captures conditions that might have to be fulﬁlled, a ReferenceActivity deﬁnes activities
that must be executed. These activities produce ReferenceArtifact that are the data that
must be managed and provided for certiﬁcation. A ReferenceTechnique speciﬁes the way
an activity is performed or artifacts are created.
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Figure 1.7 Excerpt of a RAF model for IEC 61508. Adapted from De la Vara et al.
(2016).
Safety standards rely on the traceability of safety evidence throughout the complete software
life cycle to both demonstrate compliance with standard and support claims about the safety
of the software product. Commonly required safety evidence includes: test cases, test results,
and system speciﬁcations (requirements). Because suppliers must collect and maintain these
evidence, the explicit speciﬁcation of the traces between these artifacts is an important aspect to
support the certiﬁcation process of safety critical systems.
Work from Nair et al. (2014) introduces a Safety Evidence Traceability Information Model
(SafeTIM). Its objective is to provide a broad overview of safety evidence traceability in
the context of safety critical systems. The proposed model captures the traces and evidence
information that must be created and maintained to show compliance with safety standards.
SafeTIM was developed based on an extracted set of traces that are necessary for safety evidence.
As observed on Figure 1.8, the principal concept that traces to all of the concepts of the model is
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the Artefact concept, which represent an individual and identiﬁable unit of data that is managed
throughout the software life cycle. These artifacts are used as piece of evidence for claims,
which are propositions that are being asserted in relation to system safety. Those piece of
evidence are accompanied by arguments, which are body of information that are provided in
order to establish a claim about the system safety. Artefacts are the output and are also required
as input data for various activities of the software life cycle.
Figure 1.8 The Safety Evidence Traceability Information Model (SafeTim). Adapted
from Nair et al. (2014).
Nejati et al. (2012) introduce a SysML based approach to address traceability between safety
requirements and their design implementation. An algorithm that analyses the association
between a requirement and its implementation is provided to extract design slices. Design slices
provide a detailed view of the system from the perspective of a speciﬁc safety requirement.
These are extracted from the overall design and capture the design aspects related to a target
requirement. Such slice enables the analysis of the implementation of a safety requirement by
removing the design elements that are irrelevant for the requirement under analysis. Figure 1.9
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provides an example of the resulting design slice that is extracted from the design implementation
of a provided requirement.
a) Requirement
b) Design c) Design-slice
Figure 1.9 Example of a requirement (a) and its related design slice (c) that is
extracted from a design model (b). Extracted from Nejati et al. (2012).
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1.3.2 Domain-speciﬁc approaches
1.3.2.1 UML proﬁles targeting various speciﬁc safety critical systems
Berkenkötter & Hannemann (2006) propose a domain speciﬁc language in the form of a UML
proﬁle for the railway control systems domain (RCSD). The RCSD proﬁle enables the precise
modeling of the static description of railway networks and their associated dynamic aspects.
Networks are comprised of elements such as track segments, points, signals, and sensors. These
elements are the physical entities that constitute a network of tracks on which trains are moving
through pre-deﬁned routes.
The proﬁle models the domain using a combination of class diagrams and object diagrams.
Class diagrams are used to represent problems of the railway domain (i.e. tramway and railroad
models) whereas object diagrams capture instances of these problems (i.e. the explicit track
layout). The object diagram uses either the UML notation or a notation introduced by the
authors based on the symbology of the railway domain. Figure 1.10 shows an overview of an
object diagram using the speciﬁc notation for the railway domain introduced by the RCSD
proﬁle (left side of the ﬁgure) and the UML notation (right side of the ﬁgure).
Figure 1.10 Object diagrams representing two track segments along their sensors and
signals using both UML and RCSD notation. Extracted from
Berkenkötter & Hannemann (2006).
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The dynamic aspect of the track network is deﬁned as a timed state transition system (TSTS).
The timed transitions are embedded locally in the proﬁle’s elements. To ensure safety through
the network, a controller is deﬁned and added to the network model and remain independent
from he physical elements captured in the model. The controller includes the safety conditions
for running the systems. The controller model is deﬁned using a strict mathematical model. This
mathematical deﬁnition enables to prove the violation of the safety conditions for the running
system by using bounded model checking techniques.
Panesar-Walawege et al. (2013) and Kuschnerus et al. (2012), both deﬁned UML proﬁles aimed
at the expression of certiﬁcation-related information for IEC 61508 standard. In particular,
Panesar-Walawege et al. (2013) proposed an approach to support safety-critical suppliers in
creating safety evidence needed to show compliance with a speciﬁc safety standard. The
approach is based on a process that assists preparing of the certiﬁcation evidence. This process
is comprised of 4 phases as shown in Figure 1.11. The ﬁrst two phases, occurring only once
per targeted standard, are similar to the methodology described in the work of Lagarde et al.
(2008) and Selic (2007) for deﬁning UML proﬁles. The ﬁrst phase consists in the deﬁnition
of the conceptual model that captures the concepts of the standard under scrutiny related to
certiﬁcation evidences. The second phase, consists in the mapping of these concepts to the UML
meta-model to obtain an UML proﬁle. The third phase of this approach is the application of the
proﬁle to the domain model of the system undergoing certiﬁcation. The resulting model allows
the capture of precise links between the system’s concepts and standard’s concepts. In the last
phase, the resulting model is instanciated to create evidence submitted for certiﬁcation.
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Figure 1.11 The process for the creating evidence of a safety standard. Extracted
from Panesar-Walawege et al. (2013).
Kuschnerus et al. (2012) introduced a UML proﬁle based on the concepts extracted from IEC
61508. The proﬁle uses models as baseline artifacts for certiﬁcation documentation. The
process to extract the domain model and its mapping to the UML meta-model that deﬁnes the
proﬁle is similar to the methodology described by Lagarde et al. (2008). The domain model
extracted from the standard is divided into two categories. The ﬁrst category of concepts is
related to the deﬁnition of the safety process deﬁned by IEC 61508 and captures the activities
and recommended techniques as deﬁned by the standard. This category includes the deﬁnition
of monitoring concepts for the process of designing the architecture. The second category of
the domain model deﬁnes concepts that are speciﬁc to the standard such as safety terms and
their relations. This include safety functions and the certiﬁcation status of software modules.
An excerpt of the domain model is provided in Figure 1.12.a. It contains concepts related to the
ﬁrst part of the domain. It deﬁnes the relations between an Electrical/Electronic/programmable
Electronic(E/E/PE) safety-related system, the safety integrity the system needs to conform with
and the techniques that are performed in order to realize the system. SIL Activity represents
activities deﬁned by the standard and each of these should use one or more techniques depending
on the targeted integrity level. Figure 1.12.b provides communication concepts of the second part
of the domain. In a safety-critical system, a communication shall either be safe (i.e. transmission
of data is veriﬁed by a checksum) or unsafe. Communication is established between multi-
layered communication stack using a channel as a medium. Each channel deﬁnes the protocol it
uses in order to transmit data. This proﬁle focused mainly on safety requirements.
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a)
b)
Figure 1.12 Excerpt of Kuschnerus et al.’s domain model. Adapted from Kuschnerus
et al. (2012).
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Safety-critical systems behavior are often dependent on various timing properties, thus the
correct timing of such systems is part of their functional correctness. In this context, the UML
proﬁle for Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time Embedded System (MARTE) (OMG, 2011)
primary concern is to capture the aspects related to real-time in embedded systems. MARTE is
structured as a hierarchy of sub-proﬁles, as provided in Figure 1.13.
Figure 1.13 Architecture of the MARTE proﬁle (OMG, 2011).
The "Marte foundations" package deﬁnes the foundation on which the rest of MARTE is built.
It deﬁnes four basics sets of extensions to UML, these sub-proﬁles are the following:
• Non-functional properties (NFP): provides modeling constructs for declaring, qualifying,
and applying semantically well-formed non-functional aspects of UML models. It is
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completed by the "Marte annexes" sub-proﬁle Value Speciﬁcation Language (VSL) which
is a textual language used for declaring algebraic expressions.
• Time: provides the concepts for deﬁning time in applications and for manipulating its
underlying representation.
• Generic resource modeling (GRM): provides an ontology of resources enabling the mod-
eling of common computing platforms (i.e. resources on which an application is allocated
for computation) along with the concepts needed for specifying resources usage.
• Allocation modeling (Alloc): provides the concepts pertaining to the allocation of func-
tionalities to the entities responsible for their realization. These concepts may be either time
allocation (i.e. scheduling) or spatial allocation (i.e. hardware allocation).
The remaining parts of MARTE are separated into two categories of extensions: "MARTE
design model" and "MARTE analysis model". Design models are created using annotations
containing concerns from real-time or embedded systems that are provided by the High-level
Application modeling (HLAM) sub-proﬁle. Also MARTE allows the modeling of component
based systems through its Generic Component Model (GCM) sub-proﬁle. Analysis models are
created using the Generic Quantitative Analysis Modeling (QGAM) and its two reﬁnements
dedicated to both schedulability (SAM) and performance (PAM) analysis.
1.3.2.2 UML proﬁles for avionics software
Wu et al. (2015) have developed a methodology called Safety Oriented Architecture Mod-
eling (SOAM). The method focuses on the design of a component centric architecture for
avionic software in the context of DO-178C. More precisely this approach emphasizes on the
notions related to the safety of software components. The method introduces an UML proﬁle
named SafetyProﬁle. Authors claim that the proﬁle captures safety properties in accordance
with DO-178C guidelines that apply to software components and their related interfaces. Fig-
ure 1.14 presents an excerpt from the conceptual model from which the proﬁle was derived.
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The proﬁle focuses on components-based architecture design. In fact the conceptual model
focuses on the communications between components, the deﬁnition of the component’s inter-
faces and their monitoring. The SafetyComponent is the main concept of this model. A
SafetyComponent communicate with another through a SafetyChannel. A component
may detect a Fault and needs to handle it through various MitigateAction. A component
deﬁnes SafetyInterface that are accessed throught its deﬁned SafetyPort.
Figure 1.14 Excerpt of the conceptual model used for building SafetyProﬁle.
Adapted from Wu et al. (2015).
Zoughbi et al. (2010) introduced SafeUML, a UML proﬁle based on DO-178B. Its purpose is
to capture the safety related requirements that are allocated to software and to monitor their
implementation through the software design. Furthermore the proﬁle intends to improve com-
munication and collaboration between safety engineers, software engineers and the certiﬁcation
authorities. The proﬁle is organized into packages, each package includes a set of related
concepts. The concepts from which the proﬁle is developed are grouped into ﬁve packages: 1)
the Requirements package contains the concepts that are needed to express software require-
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ments, their reﬁnement as well as the traceability of the requirements to design artifacts, 2) the
Characteristics package contains concepts to identify design elements having a direct impact
on safety by specifying the software level that is attached to these elements along with the
failure conditions that are associated to these elements, 3) the Event Management package that
deﬁnes the concepts of events and the actions related to their capture, 4) the Conﬁguration
package that deﬁnes the concepts to capture elements related to software conﬁguration, user
modiﬁable software and change control, and 5) the Replication package containing concepts to
address software redundancy. Figure 1.15 provides an overview of three of the packages that
constitute this conceptual model. A Partition is created to fulﬁll one or more Requirements,
and is partitioned from one or more SafetyCritical entities. A SafetyCritical entity may trigger
Events that must be monitored in order to be detected in the system. The Monitor is in charge of
notifying various Handlers that perform Reactions associated to the captured event.
Although DO-178B does not provide guidelines for the use of model based software devel-
opment and veriﬁcation, Stallbaum & Rzepka (2010) introduced a UML proﬁle to enable the
speciﬁcation of DO-178B compliant test models. The purpose of these test models is twofold.
The ﬁrst purpose is to enable testing activities of the software as per DO-178B guidelines. The
second is to enable the use of the models as artifacts supporting evidence for the certiﬁcation
process by capturing the required relevant testing information. From the analysis of the standard,
they identiﬁed the information that test models must capture and designed an UML proﬁle,
which is depicted in Figure 1.16. The proﬁle is used by applying the TME (TestModelElement)
stereotype to each model element to deﬁne test and certiﬁcation relevant information. A TME is
the entity that represents a test model element. It comprises the system behavior and certiﬁcation
related information. Examples of TME include activity, interaction or state. The Requirement
stereotype is used to specify software requirements and the association between requirements
and TMEs supports requirement-based test coverage analysis. The SafetyRationale stereotype
speciﬁes whether or not an element of the model is safety-critical and includes the rational for
the element’s criticality. The Interface stereotype is used to specify hardware/software interfaces.
The SoftwareComponent stereotype deﬁnes self-contained unit of the software that implement
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Figure 1.15 Excerpt of Zoughby et al.’s safety-related conceptual model.
Adapted from Zoughbi et al. (2010).
distinct functionality of the system. The proﬁle enables the capture of the following testing needs
requested by DO-178B: (1) traces between model elements and their related requirement(s),
(2) identiﬁcation of the software level(s) along the corresponding rationale, (3) identiﬁcation
of the conditions related to normal range and robustness test cases, (4) identiﬁcation of the
testing method (i.e. hardware/software integration, software integration, and low-level tests), (5)
identiﬁcation of hardware/software interfaces and their parameters, (6) traces between model
elements and software components, (7) traces between model elements and source code, and (8)
the type of the traces.
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Figure 1.16 UML proﬁle for DO-178B compliant test models. Adapted from
Stallbaum & Rzepka (2010).
1.4 Discussion
The studied approaches contribute in different ways to support the development and certiﬁcation
of safety-critical software. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the domain of application, the
objectives, the targeted standard and the software life cycle/ concerns of the approaches studied
in Section 1.3.
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Table 1.2 Summary of the studied approaches to model
various safety critical systems.
Approach Domain Objectives Targeted
standard
Software life
cycle process-
es/ Concerns
De la Vara et al.
(2016)
Multiple do-
mains
Express key
concepts and
relations used
to demonstrate
safety compli-
ance extracted
from multiple
standards
Multiple
standards
(including
DO-
178C)
Safety as-
surance and
certiﬁcation
Nair et al. (2014) Provide a model
of safety evidence
traceability
Traceability
Nejati et al. (2012) Extract design
slices related to a
requirement
Traceability of
requirements to
design
Berkenkötter & Han-
nemann (2006)
Transportation:
Railway, Sub-
way
Model the static
and dynamic as-
pects of the do-
main
Software
Design
Panesar-Walawege
et al. (2013)
Electrical
Electronic
Programmable
Devices
Support the pro-
cess of collecting
evidence for the
support of certi-
ﬁcation against a
standard
IEC 61508 Safety Require-
ments
Kuschnerus et al.
(2012)
Electrical
Electronic
Programmable
Devices
Model the stan-
dard
IEC 61508 Planning
Object Manage-
ment Group (OMG)
(2011)
Proﬁl:
MARTE
Reel time em-
bedded software
Capture and an-
alyze real time
properties of a
software
Speciﬁcation of
requirements
and design
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Approach Domain Objectives Targeted
standard
Software life
cycle process-
es/ Concerns
Wu et al. (2015)
Proﬁl:
SafetyProﬁle
Avionic Capture safety re-
lated aspects as-
signed to a soft-
ware component
DO-178C Software
Design Process
Zoughbi et al.
(2010)
Proﬁl:
SafeUML
Avionic Capture software
requirements and
monitor their im-
plementation
DO-178B Software Re-
quirements
Process, Soft-
ware Design
Process
Stallbaum & Rzepka
(2010)
Avionic Capture test data
as UML models
DO-178B Software Veriﬁ-
cation Process
Several of the explored approaches emphasize the possible ambiguous interpretation of textually
deﬁned safety standards. Because of the need to provide evidence that a standard was adequately
applied for the development of certiﬁable software, an ambiguous interpretation of the standards
results in major risks for certiﬁcation. Misinterpretation of a standard may most possibly result
in the creation of inadequate evidence hindering an already difﬁcult certiﬁcation process. This
issue calls for a unique interpretation of the standards. As a result, the introduction of model-
based development may help in reducing or suppressing the possible misinterpretations by
offering the capability to model the standards. Thus the studied approaches provide an explicit
interpretation of the standard through the models they propose. Furthermore modeling of safety
standards may lead to an automation of certain aspects of the production of artifacts supporting
certiﬁcation.
Many approaches speciﬁcally tackle avionics software (e.g. Wu et al. (2015); Zoughbi et al.
(2010); Stallbaum & Rzepka (2010)), however they propose meta-models and proﬁles that target
speciﬁc concerns in the software development. Stallbaum & Rzepka (2010) target the software
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veriﬁcation process, while Wu et al. (2015) target the software design process by capturing
safety requirements that apply to component-based software architecture. Finally, Zoughbi et al.
(2010) target the software requirement and design process by capturing various safety-related
information within the models. These approaches do not model the DO-178 standard. The RAF
meta-model (De la Vara et al., 2016) is an exception as it is built from a number of standards,
including DO-178C. However it uses a uniﬁed vocabulary that is not speciﬁc to DO-178C.
Moreover, the existing approaches do not tackle the assurance level modularity introduced by
DO-178. As a result these approaches do not consider the variations in the compliance needs
to be provided in order to achieve certiﬁcation. Indeed, the standard offers its guidelines in an
adaptive manner against the targeted design assurance level.
DO-178 also describes the speciﬁc objectives and activities to be performed along with the re-
sulting evidence to be produced during the software life cycle. None of the explored approaches
captures the information related to the software planning process as required by DO-178C. The
plan for software aspects of certiﬁcation (PSAC) captures information about the methodologies
and techniques that are used to develop the software product. These information are important
as they enable the certiﬁcation authorities to state whether or not the applied methodologies and
techniques are considered to be sufﬁcient to provide conﬁdence in the produced safety evidence.
D0-178C introduces a number of traceability requirements and needs. This introduces a number
of traceability concepts that need to be modeled. These concepts are partially covered by
existing approaches as they respectively target different aspects of the software life cycle. The
approach in Nair et al. (2014) proposes a more complete taxonomy of traceability but the
proposed taxonomy is generic and does not speciﬁcally target DO-178.
As some of these approaches were released before the current version of DO-178 they simply
could not address the guidelines introduced in the supplements to DO-178C. For instance,
among these new guidelines, in the context of model based development, DO-331 enforces the
separation of speciﬁcation models and design models. However, some of the approaches capture
the requirements directly into the design models.
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These limitations led us to deﬁne our own domain-speciﬁc language, based on the use of UML
proﬁle, to support DO-178C and its supplements.
CHAPTER 2
PROPOSED APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, we ﬁrst introduce our research objectives (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2 we
provide an overview of the proposed approach in order to achieve theses objectives. Finally in
Section 2.3, we describe the methodology that guided our research.
2.1 Research objectives
The general goal of our work is to support the process of collecting the information that is used
for airworthiness certiﬁcation. In particular, our goal is to beneﬁt from the advances made in
model-driven technologies to specify the evidence used to achieve software certiﬁcation in the
context of airborne systems that fall under the regulatory scope of DO-178C. In this context,
our speciﬁc objectives are:
• Study and analyze DO-178C to identify the information required as evidence for certiﬁcation.
• Propose a model-driven approach that supports the speciﬁcation and management of the
certiﬁcation evidence taking into consideration the assurance level of the software under
development.
• Implement and assess the proposed approach.
In this research, we focused on speciﬁc parts of the software life cycle, namely the software
planning process, the software requirements process, the software design process and the
software verﬁcation process. Moreover we limited the scope of our analysis to DO-178C
guidelines and two of its supplements: DO-331 ("Model-Based Development and Veriﬁcation
Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A") and DO-332 ("Object-Oriented Technology and
Related Techniques Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A"). This is due to the fact that the
industrial partners were using model-driven and object-oriented technologies.
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2.2 Proposal: An assurance level sensitive UML proﬁle to capture DO-178C relevant
certiﬁcation information
To achieve our research objectives, we propose to build a domain-speciﬁc modeling language that
captures information required as evidence for DO-178C certiﬁcation. The proposed language
should enable the speciﬁcation of the software life cycle data in terms of DO-178C objectives
and activities for each software process. The language should also support the speciﬁcation of
DO-178C data related to software requirements, design and veriﬁcation. Moreover, the language
must provide means to capture traceability between requirements, design and veriﬁcation data
as required by DO-178C.
An important aspect of the proposed language is to ease the collection of certiﬁcation evidence
according to the software level. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter (Section 1.1),
DO-178C deﬁnes ﬁve software levels (also named design assurance levels) that are mapped to
different failure conditions ranging from "catastrophic" (software level A) to "no safety effect"
(software level E). Each software level requires different DO-178C activities to be performed
and DO-178C objectives to be satisﬁed. Thus the proposed language is an assurance-level
sensitive modeling language. In other words, our domain speciﬁc modeling language introduces
a number of constraints which ensure that the required information for certiﬁcation is speciﬁed
according to the software level. Thus these constraints are expressed in terms of DO-178C
concepts captured by the language (e.g. activities, traceability data, veriﬁcation data) and in
terms of the software level. Figure 2.1 illustrates the concept of an assurance-level sensitive
modeling language.
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Figure 2.1 Constraints used for model validation against a designated assurance level.
We implemented our domain speciﬁc modeling language using the UML proﬁle technology.
The choice for deﬁning this modeling language as an extension to UML through its proﬁle
mechanism has been motivated by the following reasons:
• UML is one of the languages that is actually used by our industrial partners for their
model-based development activities.
• UML has been deﬁned so that it could be extended with concepts from speciﬁc domains of
application through its proﬁle mechanism. We provided a description of the UML extension
mechanisms in Section 1.2.2.
• The number of available modeling tools that support UML and its proﬁle mechanism.
2.3 Research methodology
In order to achieve our research objectives, we adopted a four-phase research methodology as
described in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 Phases of the research methodology
Phase 1: Literature review
The ﬁrst phase of our research methodology consists in studying the literature related to the
development of safety-critical software based on model-based approaches. Our literature review
has been performed with the purpose of:
• Obtaining valuable knowledge of DO-178C: We studied DO-178C to obtain extensive
knowledge of the standard’s content and the constraints it imposes on the process of devel-
oping airborne software. This comprehensive review of DO-178C enabled us to go forward
in the process of modeling the concepts deﬁned by DO-178C.
• Understanding the needs of safety critical systems: To understand the issues related to
safety-critical software development, we studied a number of existing software development
approaches, especially model-based approaches targeting safety-critical software. The study
of these approaches led us to identify their limitations in supporting DO-178C certiﬁcation.
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Phase 2: Building DO-178C conceptual model
During this phase, we further analyzed DO-178C in order to build a conceptual model that
captures the concepts embedded in the standard.
Phase 3: Mapping of the conceptual model to a UML proﬁle
The third phase of our methodology takes as input the conceptual model resulting from the
second phase of our methodology. During this phase, we perform the mapping of the concepts
we were able to extract from the standard to the UML meta-model. This activity results in the
creation of an UML proﬁle.
Phase 4: Implementing the DO-178C proﬁle and experimenting with a case study
During this phase, we ﬁrst implement our proﬁle within an open-source UML modeling tool.
We then assess our proﬁle by using it to specify a realistic case study; i.e. the landing gear
control software (LGCS) (Paz & El Boussaidi, 2017). In particular, we used the proﬁle to carry
out four use-cases corresponding to the objectives targeted by our domain speciﬁc modeling
language as discussed in Section 2.1. These use cases are the following:
• Specify the software life cycle data according to a design assurance level.
• Specify the software requirements: The proﬁle should provide modeling constructs to
specify system-requirements allocated to software and their subsequent reﬁnement into
high-level and low-level requirements as required by DO-178C.
• Specify traceability between requirements and design: Using the proﬁle, we should be able
to trace high-level requirements to software design. In the context of DO-178C, software
design includes software architecture and low-level requirements.
• Specify veriﬁcation data: The proﬁle should provide constructs to specify veriﬁcation data
including reviews, analyses, test cases and procedures. Moreover, the proﬁle should provide
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means to ensure the traceability between the veriﬁcation data and software requirements
and design data.
CHAPTER 3
A DO-178C CONCEPTUAL MODEL
From the performed analysis of DO-178C and its supplements, we have extracted a conceptual
model from which the proposed proﬁle has been developed. As discussed in Section 2, we
limited the scope of our analysis of DO-178C to a subset of processes. These processes include
the software planning process, the software requirements process, the software design process
and the software veriﬁcation process. The concepts in the resulting conceptual model, are
divided into groups corresponding to the analyzed DO-178C processes. Thus this chapter is
organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the template used to describe each concept of the
conceptual model. In Section 3.2 we describe the concepts related to the software planning
process. In section 3.3, we introduce the concepts related to the software requirements process.
Finally in Section 3.4, the concepts related to the software veriﬁcation process are deﬁned.
3.1 The template for describing the conceptual model
To describe the concepts that are part of the proposed conceptual model in a consistent and
uniform way, we used a template. The template contains the following sections:
Deﬁnition
This section provides the deﬁnition of a concept. In particular, it describes the concept and its
purpose.
Generalizations
Provides the list of concepts that are specialized by the the speciﬁed concept. This section is
provided using a table as follows:
Parent concept
Parent concept
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Attributes
This section provides the list of attributes for a concept. Attributes are used to capture relevant
properties and characteristics related to a concept. A name and a description are provided for
each attribute. The list of attributes is provided using a table as follows:
Name Description
targetedSoftwareLevel Indicate the project’s targeted software lev-
els. Because a project might be composed
of more than one component, each of them
might be assigned a different software level.
Relationships
This section provides the list of the relationships that a concept has with other concepts. For
each relationship, a name and a description are provided. The list of relationships of a concept
is provided using a table as follows:
Name Description
derivedBy Identiﬁes the requirements, 0 or more, that
derive the speciﬁed requirement.
Constraints
This section provides the list of constraints that applies to the speciﬁed concept. The constraints
are deﬁned by software levels.
The software level for a constraint represents the minimum software level for which the constraint
shall be veriﬁed. In other words, if a constraint is deﬁned for software level D, then the constraint
also applies to software levels A, B and C. Moreover, each DO-178C supplement may introduce
additional constraints.
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We do not enforce the use of a speciﬁc language to specify the constraints due to possible
implementation limitation of tools.
Constraints are provided using a table as follows:
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A requirement id must be unique Software level D None
3.2 Software Planning Process
During the software planning process, an applicant deﬁnes the activities that have to be carried
out within the software life cycle processes. The software planning process also deﬁnes the
software life cycle in terms of the sequencing of the processes, the transition criteria between
them and the feedback mechanisms (RTCA, 2011a). In particular, the plan for software aspects
of certiﬁcation (PSAC) produced during the planning process, is submitted to the certiﬁcation
authority to asses whether or not the application of a deﬁned software life cycle may result in
the production of evidences that are deemed adequate to demonstrate the safe properties of a
software product. Such statement from the certiﬁcation authorities enables the software provider
to undergo the actual development of the software product.
The conceptual model deﬁnes concepts to capture the information pertaining to the software
life cycle processes and related activities as described by the standard. The concepts were
identiﬁed through the analysis of the standard. The supplements to DO-178C are irrelevant for
the deﬁnition of the software life cycle activities as these documents do not contain additional
guidelines regarding the deﬁnition of the software life cycle. The concepts that capture the
deﬁnition of the software life cycle are depicted in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. These concepts
are described in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.1 DO-178C software life cycle conceptual model.
Figure 3.2 DO-178C software life cycle environment conceptual model.
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3.2.1 Activity
Deﬁnition
The "Activity" concept identiﬁes the tasks that must be carried out to meet an objective. These
tasks are deﬁned by DO-178C. The number of activities varies depending on the software level
that a project targets.
Attributes
Name Description
description Offers the textual description of the activity. It also provides
the reference to the chapter where the activity is deﬁned in
the standard. The following is an example of activity. 5.1.2.g
- Derived high-level requirements and the reason for their
existence should be deﬁned.
status The status of the activity. Examples of status include "In
Progress", "Pending", "Terminated", "Under Review" and
"Under Correction"
minimumApplicabilityLevel Identiﬁes the minimum software level for which the activity
must be performed. As a result if the software level is set to
D, the activity must be performed for software levels C, B
and A.
independenceMethod Speciﬁes the method in use to provide independence from
another activity when required. A mean to achieve indepen-
dence is provided when another development team performs
the activity from which independence is required.
Relationships
50
Name Description
achieves Identiﬁes the Objectives (one or more) that
are achieved by the activity.
independentFrom Speciﬁc activities are required to be per-
formed with independence from other activ-
ities. As such, this relationship identiﬁes
the activities from which an activity must be
independent.
producesData An activity produces data that are part of the
evidences required for certiﬁcation. The data
produced by an activity may include one or
more SoftwareLifeCycleData
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
if the independentFrom association is not empty, the
activity shall provide a description of the method
used to ensure that the activity is performed with
independence.
Software level D None
3.2.2 Deviation
Deﬁnition
The "Deviation" concept identiﬁes a deviation that might occur from a plan, standard or
requirement. Deviations are important as they must be submitted to the certiﬁcation authorities.
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Attributes
Name Description
description Describes what are the changes between the original plan,
standard, or requirement and the result of the actual devia-
tion. In other words it speciﬁes the actions or decisions that
resulted in a deviation.
rationale Speciﬁes the reasons why the deviation occurs.
deviatesFrom Identiﬁes one or more plan or standard from which the de-
viation occurs. "Software Veriﬁcation Plan", "Software Re-
quirements Standards"
relatedRequirement Identiﬁes zero or more requirements from which the devia-
tion occurs. "HLR-1", "SRATS-1"
Relationships
Name Description
relateTo Identiﬁes the process that is concerned by
the deviation.
3.2.3 Environment
Deﬁnition
The "Environment" concept speciﬁes the tools, procedures and notations that are used to perform
the activities related to a process.
Attributes
52
Name Description
description The description of the environment.
method Description of the methods related to the use of the speciﬁed
environment.
tool Identiﬁes the tools used in the context of the speciﬁed envi-
ronment. Example of tool includes IBM Rational DOORS
for the speciﬁcation of requirements.
procedure Description of the procedures related to the environment.
notation Speciﬁes the notations used for the environment
requireToolQualiﬁcation Identiﬁes the tools from the "tool" attribute that require to
be qualiﬁed as deﬁned by DO-330.
hardwareInvolved Identiﬁes the hardware involved for the speciﬁed environ-
ment.
3.2.4 FeedbackMechanism
Deﬁnition
The "FeedbackMechanism" concept provides a description of the way that feedback is provided
by a process to another.
Attributes
Name Description
description Description of the feedback mechanism. Example of feed-
back includes the use of reports.
method Description of the method used to communicate feedback
between processes. Feedback may be communicated through
the use of email or dedicated repository
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Name Description
prioritySystem Textual description of the system used to assess and prioritize
the created feedback.
changeApprovalSystem Textual description of the system used to approve changes
that are related to the created feedback.
Relationships
Name Description
sourceProcess Identiﬁes the process that deﬁnes the feed-
back mechanism.
destinatingProcess Identiﬁes the process that receives feedback.
3.2.5 Objective
Deﬁnition
The "Objective" concept represents the requirements that should be met in order to demonstrate
compliance with the standard (RTCA, 2011a).
Attributes
Name Description
description The description of the objective. "5.1.1.a - High-level re-
quirements are developed."
isSatisﬁed Speciﬁes if the objective has been satisﬁed.
minimumApplicabilityLevel The minimum software level applicable to the speciﬁed ob-
jective. Annexe I displays the objectives for software plan-
ning process and their software level.
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Relationships
Name Description
achieves Identiﬁes the activities, one or more, that
achieve a speciﬁc objective.
3.2.6 Process
Deﬁnition
The "Process" concept represents a collection of activities performed in the software life cycle to
produce various outputs or the software product (RTCA, 2011a) and to enable the achievement
of a set of objectives.
Attributes
Name Description
description The description of the process. The following is the descrip-
tion of the software requirement process. "The high-level
requirements are reﬁned through one or more iterations in
the software design process to develop the software archi-
tecture and the low-level requirements that can be used to
implement source code."
type The kind of process. Examples of processes include "Soft-
ware Design Process" and "Integration Process".
/isComplete Speciﬁes if the process is completed. This is derived from
the statuses of the activities of the process and its objectives.
allowPartialInput Speciﬁes if the process may begin its activities using incom-
plete input data.
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Name Description
organizationalResponsibility Speciﬁes the service, team, or person(s) responsible for the
speciﬁed process. A software engineer may be responsible
for the process.
Relationships
Name Description
contains Identiﬁes the activities that are performed in
the context of the speciﬁed process.
deﬁnes Speciﬁes the transition criterion for the pro-
cess that are to be satisﬁed in order to transit
to another process.
objectives Identiﬁes the objectives that are attached to
the speciﬁed process.
uses Speciﬁes the environment(s) used to perform
the activities of the speciﬁed process.
outputs Speciﬁes the list of software life cycle data
that the process outputs.
inputs Speciﬁes the list of software life cycle data
that the process receives as input.
sourceProcess Identiﬁes the feedback mechanism(s) deﬁned
by the speciﬁed process
relateTo Identiﬁes the deviation related to the speci-
ﬁed process.
Constraints
• Processes Inputs
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
If the process type value is set to SoftwareRequire-
mentsProcess, then the software life cycle data re-
ceived as inputs by the process shall contain the fol-
lowing elements: SystemRequirements, HardwareIn-
terface, SystemArchitecture, Software Development
Plan and Software Requirements Standards. When
DO-331 is used inputs shall also contain Software
Model Standards.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareDesign-
Process, then the software life cycle data received
as inputs by the process shall contain the follow-
ing elements: SoftwareRequirementsData, Software
Development Plan and Software Design Standards.
When DO-331 is used inputs shall also contain Soft-
ware Model Standards.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareCoding-
Process, then the software life cycle data received
as inputs by the process shall contain the following
elements: Software Design Description, Software
Development Plan and Software Code Standards.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to IntegrationProcess,
then the software life cycle data received as inputs
by the process shall contain the following elements:
Software Design Description and Source Code.
Software level D None
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
If the process type value is set to SoftwareVeri-
ﬁcationProcess, then the software life cycle data
received as inputs by the process shall contain
the following elements: SystemRequirements, Soft-
wareRequirementsData, SoftwareDesignDescrip-
tion, TraceData, SourceCode, ExecutableObject-
Code and SoftwareVeriﬁcationPlan.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to CertiﬁcationLi-
aisonProcess, then the software life cycle data re-
ceived as inputs by the process shall contain the
following elements: Plan for Software Aspect of Cer-
tiﬁcation, Software Accomplishment Summary and
Software Conﬁguration Index.
Software level D None
• Processes Outputs:
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
If the process type value is set to SoftwarePlanning-
Process, then the software life cycle data received
as outputs by the process shall contain the follow-
ing elements: Plan for Software Aspect of Certiﬁ-
cation, Software Development Plan, Software Veri-
ﬁcation Plan, Software Conﬁguration Management
Plan, Software Quality Assurance Plan, Software Re-
quirements Standards, Software Design Standards,
Software Code Standards and Software Veriﬁcation
Results. When DO-331 is used outputs shall also
contain Software Model Standards.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareRequire-
mentsProcess, then the software life cycle data re-
ceived as outputs by the process shall contain the
following elements: SoftwareRequirementsData and
TraceData.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareDesign-
Process, then the software life cycle data received as
outputs by the process shall contain the following el-
ements: SoftwareDesignDescription and TraceData.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareCoding-
Process, then the software life cycle data received as
outputs by the process shall contain the following
elements: Source Code and Trace Data.
Software level D None
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
If the process type value is set to IntegrationProcess,
then the software life cycle data received as outputs
by the process shall contain the following elements:
Executable object code and Parameter Data item ﬁle.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareVeriﬁ-
cationProcess, then the software life cycle data re-
ceived as outputs by the process shall contain the
following elements: SoftwareVeriﬁcationCasesAnd-
Procedures, SoftwareVeriﬁcationResults and Trace-
Data.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareConﬁg-
urationManagementProcess, then the software life
cycle data received as outputs by the process shall
contain the following elements: Software conﬁgura-
tion management records, Software Conﬁguration
Index and Software Life Cycle Environment Conﬁgu-
ration Index.
Software level D None
If the process type value is set to SoftwareQual-
ityAssuranceProcess, then the software life cycle
data received as outputs by the process shall contain
the following elements: Software Quality Assurance
Records.
Software level D None
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
If the process type value is set to CertiﬁcationLi-
aisonProcess, then the software life cycle data re-
ceived as outputs by the process shall contain the
following elements: Plan for Software Aspect of Cer-
tiﬁcation, Software Accomplishment Summary and
Software Conﬁguration Index.
Software level D None
• Objectives:
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objectives 4.1.b, 4.1.c, 4.1.e, 4.1.f and 4.1.g1
Software level C2 None
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objectives 4.1.a, 4.1.d
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareRequirement-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objectives 5.1.1.a and 5.1.1.b
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareRequirement-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objective MB.5.1.1.c
Software level D DO-331
1 The way the objectives are referenced reuse the reference deﬁned in DO-178C for each objective as
observed in Appendix I.
2 We remind the reader that this software level represents the minimum level to which the constraint
applies. For instance, this constraint applies to software levels A, B and C.
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objective 5.2.1.b
Software level C None
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objectives 5.2.1.a
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objective MB.5.2.1.c
Software level D DO-331
When the process is of type SoftwareCodingPro-
cess, the objectives of the process are the following:
Objective 5.3.1.a
Software level C None
When the process is of type IntegrationProcess, the
objectives of the process are the following: Objective
5.4.1.a
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objective 6.4.4.c (modiﬁed condition/decision
coverage and veriﬁcation of additional code)3.
Software level A None
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the fol-
lowing: Objectives 6.3.1.c, 6.3.2.c, 6.3.2.d, 6.3.3.c,
6.3.3.d, 6.3.4.c, 6.4.4.c (decision coverage)4
Software level B None
3 The achievement of this objective varies depending on the software level.
4 The achievement of this objective varies depending on the software level.
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the fol-
lowing: Objectives 6.3.1.d, 6.3.1.e, 6.3.1.g, 6.3.2.a,
6.3.2.b, 6.3.2.e, 6.3.2.f, 6.3.2.g, 6.3.3.a, 6.3.3.b,
6.3.3.e, 6.3.4.a, 6.3.4.b, 6.3.4.d, 6.3.4.e, 6.3.4.f,
6.3.5.a, 6.6.b, 6.4.c, 6.4.d, 6.4.5.b, 6.4.5.c, 6.4.4.b,
6.4.4.c (statement coverage)5, 6.4.4.d.
Software level C None
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objectives OO.6.7.1 and OO.6.8.1
Software level C DO-332
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objectives 6.3.1.a, 6.3.1.b, 6.3.1.f, 6.3.3.f, 6.6.a,
6.4.a, 6.4.b, 6.4.e, 6.4.4.a.
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareVeriﬁcation-
Process, the objectives of the process are the fol-
lowing: Objectives MB.6.8.3.2.a, MB.6.8.3.2.b and
MB.6.8.3.2.c.
Software level D DO-331
When the process is of type SoftwareConﬁguration-
ManagementProcess, the objectives of the process
are the following: Objectives 7.1.a, 7.1.b, 7.1.c,
7.1.d, 7.1.e, 7.1.f, 7.1.g, 7.1.h and 7.1.i
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareQualityAssur-
anceProcess, the objectives of the process are the
following: Objectives 8.1.a, 8.1.b and 8.1.c.
Software level C None
5 The achievement of this objective varies depending on the software level.
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwareQualityAssur-
anceProcess, the objectives of the process are the
following: Objectives 8.1.b and 8.1.d.
Software level D None
When the process is of type CertiﬁcationLiaison-
Process, the objectives of the process are the follow-
ing: Objectives 9.a, 9.b and 9.c.
Software level D None
• Activities:
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess the activities of the process are the following:
Activities 4.3.b, 4.4.1, 4.4.2.a, 4.4.2.b, 4.4.2.c, 4.4.3,
4.2.b, 4.5, 4.3.a and 4.6.
Software level C None
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess the activities of the process are the following:
Activities 4.2.a, 4.2.c, 4.2.d, 4.2.e, 4.2.g, 4.2.i, 4.2.l,
4.3.c, 4.2.f, 4.2.h, 4.2.j and 4.2.k
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess the activities of the process are the following:
Activities MB.4.4.4.a, MB.4.4.4.b and MB.4.4.4.c
Software level C DO-331
When the process is of type SoftwarePlanningPro-
cess the activities of the process are the following:
Activities MB.4.2.m, MB.4.2.n and MB.4.2.o
Software level D DO-331
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwareRequire-
mentsProcess the activities of the process are the
following: Activities 5.1.2.a, 5.1.2.b, 5.1.2.c, 5.1.2.d,
5.1.2.e, 5.1.2.f, 5.1.2.g, 5.1.2.h, 5.1.2.i, 5.1.2.j and
5.5.a
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareRequire-
mentsProcess the activities of the process are the
following: Activities MB.5.1.2.k, MB.5.1.2.l
Software level D DO-331
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignProcess
the activities of the process are the following: Activ-
ities 5.2.2.e, 5.2.2.f, 5.2.2.g, 5.2.3.a, 5.2.3.b, 5.2.4.a,
5.2.4.b, 5.2.4.c, 5.5.b, 5.2.2.b, 5.2.2.c.
Software level C None
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignProcess
the activities of the process are the following: Activ-
ities 5.2.2.a, 5.2.2.d.
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignProcess
the activities of the process are the following: Activ-
ity MB.5.2.2.h
Software level D DO-331
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignProcess
the activities of the process are the following: Activ-
ities OO.5.2.2.i and OO.5.5.d
Software level C DO-332
When the process is of type SoftwareDesignProcess
the activities of the process are the following: Activ-
ities OO.5.2.2.h, OO.5.2.2.i, OO.5.2.2.j, OO.5.2.2.k
and OO.5.2.2.l.
Software level D DO-332
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type SoftwareCodingPro-
cess the activities of the process are the following:
Activities 5.3.2.a, 5.3.2.b, 5.3.2.c, 5.3.2.d and 5.5.c
Software level C None
When the process is of type IntegrationProcess the
activities of the process are the following: Activities
5.4.2.a, 5.4.2.b, 5.4.2.c, 5.4.2.d, 5.4.2.e and 5.4.2.f
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareConﬁguration-
ManagementProcess the activities of the process are
the following: Activities 7.2.1.a, 7.2.1.b, 7.2.1.c,
7.2.1.d, 7.2.1.e, 7.2.2.a, 7.2.2.b, 7.2.2.c, 7.2.2.d,
7.2.2.e, 7.2.2.f, 7.2.2.g, 7.2.3.a, 7.2.3.b, 7.2.3.c,
7.2.4.a, 7.2.4.b, 7.2.4.c, 7.2.4.d, 7.2.4.e, 7.2.5.a,
7.2.5.b, 7.2.5.c, 7.2.5.d, 7.2.6.a, 7.2.6.b, 7.2.7.a,
7.2.7.b, 7.2.7.c, 7.2.7.d, 7.2.7.e, 7.4.a, 7.4.b, 7.5.a,
7.5.b and 7.5.c.
Software level D None
When the process is of type SoftwareQualityAssur-
anceProcess the activities of the process are the fol-
lowing: Activities 8.2.b, 8.2.h, and 8.2.e
Software level C None
When the process is of type SoftwareQualityAssur-
anceProcess the activities of the process are the fol-
lowing: Activities 8.2.a, 8.2.c, 8.2.d, 8.2.f, 8.2.h,
8.2.i, 8.2.g, 8.3.a, 8.3.b, 8.3.c, 8.3.d, 8.3.e, 8.3.f,
8.3.g, 8.3.h, and 8.3.i
Software level D None
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Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the process is of type CertiﬁcationLiaison-
Process the activities of the process are the follow-
ing: Activities 9.1.a, 9.1.b, 9.1.c, 9.2.a, 9.2.b, and
9.2.c
Software level D None
3.2.7 SimulationEnvironment
Deﬁnition
The "SimulationEnvironment" concept provides the description of the environment used for
simulation purpose.
Generalizations
Parent concept
SoftwareTestEnvironment (See 3.2.11)
Attributes
Name Description
simulatorLimit Describes the limitations that are imposed by the simulator.
simulatorCapability Deﬁnes the capabilities of the simulator.
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Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
The use of a simulation environment shall comply
with DO-331.
Software level D DO-331
3.2.8 SoftwareDevelopmentEnvironment
Deﬁnition
The "SoftwareDevelopmentEnvironment" concept speciﬁes various information related to the
software development environment.
Generalizations
Parent concept
Environment (See 3.2.3)
Attributes
Name Description
programmingLanguage Identiﬁes the programming languages used to deﬁne the
source code of the software. Examples of programming
languages include "ADA", "C++" and "C
compiler Speciﬁes the compilers that are used to produce the exe-
cutable object code.
assumption Identiﬁes the assumptions that are made about the environ-
ment.
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Name Description
requirementDevelopmentMethod Describes the method used for the development of the soft-
ware requirements. "The Software Requirements Data will
be structured and written based on the set of recommended
practices on requirements engineering and management from
the Requirements Engineering Management Handbook"
designMethod Describes the method(s) used in order to specify the software
design. "Some LLRs require to be expressed textually using
design by contract."
codingMethod Describes the method(s) used for the coding activities. "The
LGCS is to be designed with UML 2.X and implemented in
the Java programming language with the Java Development
Kit (JDK) 8 and the Eclipse IDE. No special tools should
be used to generate the code. Beyond the constraints stated
here, no further constraints are placed on the use of support
tools or hardware platforms."
linker Identiﬁes the linkers that are used to assemble the object
code.
3.2.9 SoftwareLifeCycle
Deﬁnition
The "SoftwareLifeCycle" concept represents the ordered collection of processes that is consid-
ered sufﬁcient and appropriate by an organization to produce a software product (RTCA,2011a).
The software life cycle is deﬁned by identifying the activities for each process, specifying a
sequence for the processes (through transition criterion), and assigning responsibilities for the
processes and as such for the activities.
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Attributes
Name Description
appliedSupplement Identiﬁes the supplements that are to be used for the devel-
oped software. They are additional guidelines that affect the
evidence to be provided for certiﬁcation when using speciﬁc
software development technologies. Supplements include:
DO-330, DO-331, DO-332 and DO-333.
targetedSoftwareLevel Indicates the project’s targeted software levels. Because a
project might be composed of more than one component,
each of them might be assigned different software levels.
DO-178C deﬁnes 5 software levels: A, B, C, D and E
singleLevelOfRequirement Speciﬁes if the project uses a single level of requirement in
order to specify its requirements. When this is set to false, the
requirements are clearly organized into system requirements
allocated to software (SRATs), high-level requirements and
low-level requirements
previouslyDevelopedSoftware Speciﬁes if the software uses previously developed software.
multipleVersionDissimilarSoftware Speciﬁes if the software is a multiple version dissimilar
software.
userModiﬁableSoftware Speciﬁes if the software is modiﬁable by its user.
paramaterDataItemFile Speciﬁes if the software uses parameter data item ﬁles.
deactivatedCode Speciﬁes if the source code contains deactivated code.
Relationships
Name Description
isComposedOf Identiﬁes the processes that constitute the
speciﬁed Software Life Cycle.
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Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
The value of singleLevelOfRequirement must be set
to false when a model based technology is in use.
Software level D DO-331
3.2.10 SoftwareLifeCycleData
Deﬁnition
The "SoftwareLifeCycleData" concept represents the documents that compile the data that have
to be produced during the processes of the software life cycle. Such data are used to obtain
certiﬁcation of the software product and for post certiﬁcation changes occurring to the software.
Examples of produced data include requirements speciﬁcation (SRD), requirements standards
(SRS), plan for software aspects of certiﬁcation (PSAC), software development plan (SDP), bug
reports, test results (SVR), etc. DO-178C does not impose a speciﬁc form for the representation
of these data.
Attributes
Name Description
type Speciﬁes the kind of the data. Examples include "Software
Requirements Data", "Plan for Software Aspects of Certiﬁ-
cation".
controlCategory Identiﬁes the control category placed upon the Software Life
Cycle Data. Control categories inﬂuence the activities of
the software conﬁguration management process that applies
to a SoftwareLifeCycleData. DO-178C deﬁnes two control
categories: "Control Category 1", "Control Category 2".
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Relationships
Name Description
isProducedBy Identiﬁes the activity that produce data for
the speciﬁed SoftwareLifeCycleData.
3.2.11 SoftwareTestEnvironment
Deﬁnition
The "SoftwareTestEnvironment" concept speciﬁes various informations related to the used
testing environments.
Generalizations
Parent concept
Environment (See 3.2.3)
Attributes
Name Description
differenceWithTargetComputer Describes of the differences between the target computer
and the emulator or simulator used to perform the testing
activities.
testTargetPlatform Identiﬁes the platform that is used to perform the testing
activities. "TargetComputer", "TargetComputerEmulator",
"HostComputerSimulator"
testTargetDescription Description of the test platform used to perform the testing
activities.
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3.2.12 TransitionCriterion
Deﬁnition
The "TransitionCriterion" represents the minimum conditions deﬁned by the software planning
process to be satisﬁed in order to enter a process (RTCA,2011a).
Attributes
Name Description
description The textual description of the transition criteria. "The soft-
ware veriﬁcation process review have been performed."
isSatisﬁed States whether the transition criteria is being met in order to
enter its destination process.
condition Speciﬁes the conditions that constitute the transition crite-
rion. "High-level requirements must be speciﬁed and re-
viewed"
transitFromIncompleteProcess States whether a transition criteria allows transition from an
incomplete process.
allowReEntrance Speciﬁes if the destination process can be re-entered.
Relationships
Name Description
transitionTo Speciﬁes the process that shall be entered
once the conditions of the transition criteria
are satisﬁed.
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3.3 Software Requirements Process
Requirements are used to specify the capabilities, conditions and limitations that a system must
satisfy (Langer & Tautschnig, 2008). Requirements are usually classiﬁed into several categories.
In a DO-178C context, requirements categories include: functional requirements, operational
requirements, interface requirements, performance requirements, security requirements, mainte-
nance requirements, certiﬁcation requirements, safety related requirements, and other types of
requirements. In the avionics context, the software requirements are developed from the system
requirements allocated to software (SRATs). In fact, SRATs are successively developed into
high-level requirements and low-level requirements.
The DO-178C proﬁle intends to provide modeling constructs that enable the speciﬁcation of
requirements and their traceability. The guidelines related to the speciﬁcation of requirements
are provided as part of the software requirement process (speciﬁcation of HLRs) and the software
design process (speciﬁcation of LLRs). However, the software design process does not focus
solely on the deﬁnition of the LLRs. It also includes the deﬁnition of the software architecture.
Because the concepts of HLRs and LLRs share many common properties, we have decided to
deﬁne the LLRs concept within the conceptual model built from the analysis of the software
requirement process. This analysis has been completed with the portion of the software design
process pertaining to LLRs speciﬁcation.
The concepts that capture the deﬁnition of requirements and their traceability as deﬁned by
DO-178C are depicted in Figure 3.3. These concepts are described in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.3 DO-178C requirements conceptual model.
3.3.1 HighLevelRequirement
Deﬁnition
The "HighLevelRequirement" (HLR) concept describes software requirements that are devel-
oped from the analysis of the system requirements that are allocated to software, safety-related
requirements and the system architecture (RTCA, 2011a).
Generalizations
Parent concept
Requirement (See 3.3.4)
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Attributes
Name Description
precludeSystemHazard Speciﬁes if the HLR speciﬁcation intends to prevent one or
more of the identiﬁed system hazards.
describeDesign Speciﬁes if a HLR include design details. (As described by
DO-178C, HLRs should not include such details.)
containVeriﬁcationDetail Speciﬁes if a HLR include veriﬁcation details. (As described
by DO-178C, HLRs should not include such details.)
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
Derived High-level Requirements must be justiﬁed
by a Rationale.
Software level D None
A high-level requirement must be traceable to the
system requirement allocated to software it reﬁnes.
Software level D None
When the describeDesign attribute is set to true, the
reason for the description of design details should be
justiﬁed by a rationale.
Software level D None
When the containVeriﬁcationDetail attribute is set
to true, a rationale should be provided to justify the
capture of veriﬁcation details in the requirement.
Software level D None
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3.3.2 LowLevelRequirement
Deﬁnition
The "LowLevelRequirements" (LLR) concept describes software requirements that are devel-
oped from the high-level requirements, derived requirements, and design constraints. Low-level
requirements are requirements from which source code can be directly implemented without
further information (RTCA, 2011a).
Generalizations
Parent concept
Requirement (See 3.3.4)
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A derived low-level requirement must be justiﬁed by
a rationale.
Software level C None
3.3.3 Rationale
Deﬁnition
The "Rationale" concept purpose is to provide justiﬁcation for the decisions that are made during
the software life cycle.
Attributes
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Name Description
type Identiﬁes the type of rationale. Possible values include:
"Undeﬁned", "DesignDetailJustiﬁcation" and "Veriﬁcation-
DetailJustiﬁcation".
text The rationale’s text.
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A rationale text must always be speciﬁed. Software level D None
3.3.4 Requirement
Deﬁnition
The "Requirement" concept is a general concept that describes all requirements including
SRATs, HLRs and LLrs. A requirement’s purpose is to describe what is to be performed by the
system, or the software given a set of inputs and constraints (RTCA, 2011a). Requirements can
be either functional or non-functional (i.e. speciﬁed by its type attribute). Requirements are
traceable to higher or lower level of requirements through the reﬁnement relationship. They are
also traceable to derived requirements through the derivation relationship.
Attributes
Name Description
id The unique ID that is used to identify a requirement. Exam-
ples of ID include: "SRATS-10", "HLR-1" or "LLR-27".
78
Name Description
text The speciﬁcation of the requirement. The following is an
example of a requirement text. "If the validateSensorData
function is active, the three readings are valid and have equal
values, the overall sensor value shall be this common value
and be valid."
type Identiﬁes the type of requirement. Possible values include:
"FunctionalRequirement", "OperationalRequirement", "In-
terfaceRequirement", "PerformanceRequirement", "Secu-
rityRequirement", "MaintenanceRequirement", "Certiﬁca-
tionRequirement", "AdditionalRequirement", "SafetyRelate-
dRequirement" and "ComponentResuseRequirement".
isDerived Identiﬁes if a requirement is a derived requirement. Derived
requirements are requirements that are not directly trace-
able to higher level requirements and/or are requirements
that specify behavior beyond that speciﬁed by the system
requirement or the high-level requirements.
isStable Speciﬁes if a requirement is stable. A stable requirement
indicates that its speciﬁcation shall not evolve.
status Speciﬁes the status of the veriﬁcation activities related to
the requirement. Possible values are: "Unreviewed", "Re-
viewed&Incorrect", "Reviewed&Accepted".
isVeriﬁable Speciﬁes if veriﬁcation activities can be performed on the
requirement.
isConsistent Speciﬁes if the requirement is consistent as deﬁned by the
review made of the requirement.
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Name Description
isFormalizable Speciﬁes if the requirement can be speciﬁed using a formal
notation. If set to "True" this enables its representation and
veriﬁcation with a formal method.
formalDescription A formal speciﬁcation of the requirement.
Relationships
Name Description
reﬁnement Speciﬁes the reﬁnement of a requirement into a lower level
of requirement, enabling the bi-directional traceability of the
involved requirements.
The relationship reads as follows:
• reﬁnedBy: a requirement is reﬁned by zero or more re-
quirements.
• reﬁnes: a requirement reﬁnes another.
derivation Identiﬁes the speciﬁcation of derived requirements, enabling
bi-directional traceability between the derived requirement
and the requirement being derived.
The relationship reads as follows:
• derivedBy: a requirement is derived by zero or more
requirements.
• derives: a requirement derives another.
satisfaction Identiﬁes the design elements that satisfy a requirement.
The relationship reads as follows:
• satisﬁedBy: a requirement is satisﬁed by one or more de-
sign elements.
• satisﬁes: a design element satisﬁes one or more require-
ments.
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Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
When the isFormalizable attribute is set to true, the
attribute formalDescription shall provide a formal
speciﬁcation for the requirement.
Software level D DO-333
A requirement id must be unique Software level D None
A requirement id must be speciﬁed. Software level D None
A requirement text attribute must not be empty. Software level D None
3.3.5 SystemRequirement
Deﬁnition
The "SystemRequirement" (SRAT) concept represents requirements that describe at the system
level the functionality that the system, as a whole, must fulﬁll in order to satisfy the stakeholders
needs.
Generalizations
Parent concept
Requirement (See 3.3.4)
Attributes
Name Description
allocatedToSoftware Identiﬁes if the system requirement is allocated to software.
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3.4 Software Veriﬁcation Process
The veriﬁcation activities deﬁned by the software veriﬁcation process of DO-178C involve the
technical assessment of the output of the software planning process, the software development
process, the software coding process, the integration process and the software veriﬁcation process
itself. The subset of the conceptual model related to the software veriﬁcation process deﬁnes
the concepts that capture the information related to the activities that have to be performed as
part of the software veriﬁcation process as required by DO-178C.
The main purpose of these concepts is to capture the information generated during reviews,
analyses and testing activities that are performed in order to demonstrate the software ability to
execute safely in its operating environment and that the developed software product complies
with its associated airworthiness requirements.
The concepts that we have deﬁned in order to capture these information and their related trace-
ability are introduced in Figure 3.4 These concepts are described in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.4 Veriﬁcation conceptual model.
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3.4.1 Analysis
Deﬁnition
The "Analysis" concept is used to deﬁne an analysis that could be carried out on a requirement,
a test case or a review. Analyses provide repeatable evidences of correctness for the element(s)
under scrutiny.
Attributes
Name Description
id An unique ID used to identify an analysis. Example of ID
includes: "Analysis 1".
scope Description of the scope of the analysis.
method The method that is used to perform the analysis
Relationships
Name Description
produces Speciﬁes the result of the performed analy-
sis.
target Identiﬁes the objective that the analysis in-
tends to meet.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the requirement on which the anal-
ysis is performed.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the test case on which the analysis
is performed.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the test procedure on which the
analysis is performed.
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3.4.2 Result
Deﬁnition
The "Result" concept captures the information resulting from an analysis or a review.
Attributes
Name Description
result Description of the results obtained from an analysis or a
review.
3.4.3 Review
Deﬁnition
The "Review" concept is used to deﬁne a review. Reviews provide a qualitative assessment of
correctness for the element(s) under scrutiny. Requirements, test cases, test procedures, analyses
and reviews can be reviewed.
Attributes
Name Description
id The unique ID used to identify the review. Example of ID
includes: "Review 1".
scope Description of the scope of the review.
method The method used to perform the review. A review may be a
checklist.
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Name Description
requireAdditionalTest Speciﬁes if the review needs additional tests in order to
be carried out and as such, to express the results of the
performed review.
Relationships
Name Description
produces Speciﬁes the result of the performed review.
target Identiﬁes the objective that the review in-
tends to meet.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the requirement on which the re-
view is performed.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the test case on which the review
is performed.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the test procedure on which the
review is performed.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the review on which a review is
performed.
3.4.4 TestCase
Deﬁnition
The "TestCase" concept represents the set of inputs, execution conditions and expected results
developed for a particular testing objective. Examples of testing objectives include the execution
of a speciﬁc program path or the veriﬁcation of compliance against a speciﬁc requirement.
Attributes
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Name Description
id The unique ID used to identify the test case. Example of ID
includes: "TestCase 1".
purpose Description of the objective of test case.
passFailCriterion Criterion that deﬁnes the conditions to be met by the test
case after its execution in order to deﬁne if it passes or fails.
expectedResult Description of the expected results for the test case.
testingLevel The kind of test that is speciﬁed. DO-178C testing levels in-
clude: "HardwareSoftwareIntegrat-ionTesting", "SoftwareIn-
tegrationTesting", "LowLevelTesting".
type Speciﬁes the type of test case. Possible values are: "Robust-
nessTestCase" and "NormalRangeTestCase".
Relationships
Name Description
carriesOut Identiﬁes the test procedures that describe
how to execute the speciﬁed test case.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the requirement that is veriﬁed by
the speciﬁed test case.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the reviews that perform a review
of the speciﬁed test case.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the analysis that perform an analy-
sis on the speciﬁed test case.
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3.4.5 TestProcedure
Deﬁnition
The "TestProcedure" concept captures the detailed instructions for the set-up and execution of a
given test case, along with the instructions required for the evaluation of the related test case
execution results.
Attributes
Name Description
id The unique ID used to identify the procedure. Example of
ID includes: "test procedure 1".
executionInstruction Description of the instructions required to execute the related
test case.
resultEvaluationMethod The method used to analyze the result obtained from per-
forming the test.
Relationships
Name Description
carriesOut Identiﬁes the test case that is related to the
speciﬁed test procedure.
produces Speciﬁes the result of the performed test.
uses Speciﬁes the environments that are used in
order to perform the test.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the reviews that perform a review
of the speciﬁed test procedure.
veriﬁcation Identiﬁes the analyses that perform an analy-
sis on the speciﬁed test procedure.
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3.4.6 TestResult
Deﬁnition
The "TestResult" concept captures the resulting information related to a test case execution. The
test results are meant to be compared with the expected test results provided by the test case in
order to evaluate the results of the execution of the related test case.
Generalizations
Parent concept
Result (See 3.4.2)
Attributes
Name Description
verdict Speciﬁes the ﬁnal result of the performed test. The value of
the verdict may be: "None", "Pass", "Inconclusive", "Fail"
or "Error".
CHAPTER 4
AN ASSURANCE LEVEL SENSITIVE UML PROFILE FOR SUPPORTING DO-178C
In order to describe the proposed proﬁle, this chapter is organized as follows. In Section
4.1, we present the architecture of the proﬁle. In Section 4.2, the template used to describe
the stereotypes of the proposed proﬁle is introduced. In Section 4.3, the stereotypes of the
LifeCycle package are introduced. in Section 4.4, the stereotypes of the Requirements package
are introduced. Finally, in Section 4.5 the stereotypes of the Veriﬁcation package are introduced.
4.1 Proﬁle architecture
Based on the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3, we built an UML proﬁle that supports
DO-178C. In particular the proﬁle enables capturing the information related to the planning,
requirement speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation processes. Our proﬁle has the unique characteristic of
being sensitive to the assurance level of the software and specifying the information related to
the software life cycle.
In order to preserve the logical structure deﬁned in DO-178C, the proposed proﬁle was organized
into different packages. Figure 4.1 depicts the packages of the proﬁle and their inter-relationships.
The content of these packages resulted from the mapping of the conceptual model presented in
Chapter 3 to the UML metamdel. These packages are the following:
• LifeCycle: This package groups the concepts that pertain to the deﬁnition of a project life
cycle as prescribed by the standard.
• Requirements: This package includes the concepts that are related to requirements deﬁni-
tion and management as deﬁned by the standard.
• Veriﬁcation: This package groups the concepts that pertain to validation and veriﬁcation
activities as deﬁned by the standard.
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• Types1: This package deﬁnes a set of types used by other packages of the proﬁle.
Figure 4.1 The package structure of the proposed proﬁle.
4.2 UML Proﬁle - Template description
We have developed a template with the goal of providing the reader with a clear and easy to
understand speciﬁcation for the stereotypes of the introduced proﬁle. In order to build this
template, we have explored the existing relevant literature in order to gain knowledge on the
current practices used to describe UML proﬁles. This exploration led us to the following
documents:
1 The content of the Types package is provided in Appendix I.
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• the UML speciﬁcation (OMG, 2015)
• Meta Object Facility (MOF) Core Speciﬁcation (OMG, 2015)
• the System Modeling Language (SysML) speciﬁcation (OMG, 2014)
• Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time Embedded Systems (MARTE) speciﬁcation (OMG,
2011)
• the UML testing proﬁle (UTP) (OMG, 2014)
• the UML Proﬁle for BPMN Processes (OMG, 2014)
• the UML Proﬁle for Advanced and Integrated Telecommunication Services (TelcoML)
(OMG, 2014)
Our template has been built upon a combination of elements that were used in the aforementioned
proﬁle speciﬁcations. We believe using a template that follows a similar structure to the ones
used by standardized proﬁles will help the reader in the comprehension of the content of our
proﬁle.
The template to describe the stereotypes of our proﬁle is composed of the following sections:
Description
Provides a general description of the speciﬁed stereotype.
Related concept
Identiﬁes the concept of the conceptual model that the stereotype represents.
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Extensions 2
Provides the list of the UML metaclasses being extended by the speciﬁed stereotype.
This section is provided using a table as follows:
Base Metaclass Explanation
Metaclass name Explanation
Generalizations 2
Provides the list of stereotypes that are specialized by the the speciﬁed stereotype.
This section is provided using a table as follows:
Parent class name Explanation
Parent class name Explanation
Attributes
The attribute section of the template provides the list of attributes for the stereotype being
speciﬁed.
The list of attributes is provided using a table as follows:
2 Only one of the sections "Extensions" or "Generalizations" is to be used for the description of a
stereotype as a stereotype can either extend a metaclass of the UML metamodel or generalize another
stereotype.
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
Attribute name type [0..*] References the
description of the
related attribute
in the conceptual
model
True or
false
Associations
Provides the list of associations for the speciﬁed stereotype. It is provided using a table as
follows:
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed mem-
ber end
Association name type [0..*] Description Opposed member
end name
Constraints
Provides the list of constraints that applies to the speciﬁed stereotype. To avoid redundancy, in
this section we refer to the constraints already introduced in Chapter 3 that are related to the
concept represented to by the speciﬁed stereotype.
4.3 LifeCycle Package
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 introduce the mapping of the conceptual models provided respectively
in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 to the UML meta-model.
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Figure 4.2 LifeCycle package diagram.
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Figure 4.3 LifeCycle package diagram, Environment related entities.
The stereotypes of the LifeCycle Package are the following:
4.3.1 «Activity»
Description
The «Activity» stereotype represents the tasks that must be carried out to meet an objective.
These tasks are deﬁned by DO-178C. The number of activities varies depending on the software
level that a project targets.
Related concept
See Activity (3.2.1).
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Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description ActivityType [1] See description
from Activity
(3.2.1).
False
status ActivityState [1] See status from
Activity (3.2.1).
False
minimumApplicabilityLevel SoftwareLevel [1] See minimumAp-
plicabilityLevel
from Activity
(3.2.1).
False
independenceMethod String [1] See indepen-
denceMethod
from Activity
(3.2.1).
False
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Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
achieves Association [1..*] See achieves
from Activity
(3.2.1).
«Objective»
independentFrom Association [*] See independent-
From from Activ-
ity (3.2.1).
«Activity»
producesData Association [1..*] See procud-
esData from
Activity (3.2.1).
«SoftwareLifeCycleData»
Constraints
See Activity (3.2.1).
4.3.2 «Deviation»
Description
The «Deviation» stereotype represents a deviation that might occur from a plan, standard or
requirement. Deviation are important as they must be submitted to the certiﬁcation authorities.
Related concept
See Deviation (3.2.2).
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Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description String [1] See description
from Deviation
(3.2.2).
False
rationale «Rationale» [1] See rationale
from Deviation
(3.2.2).
False
deviatesFrom «SoftwareLifeCycleData» [*] See deviates-
From from
Deviation
(3.2.2).
False
relatedRequirement «Requirements» [*] See relate-
dRequirement
from Deviation
(3.2.2).
False
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Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed
member
end
relateTo Association [1] See relateTo from Devi-
ation (3.2.2).
«Process»
4.3.3 «Environment»
Description
«Environment» is an abstract stereotype that speciﬁes the tools, procedures and notations that
are used to perform the activities related to a process.
Related concept
See Environment (3.2.3).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
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Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description String [1] See description
from Environ-
ment (3.2.3).
False
method String [1] See method from
Environment
(3.2.3).
False
tool String [1..*] See tool from En-
vironment (3.2.3).
False
procedure String [1..*] See procedure
from Environ-
ment (3.2.3).
False
notation String [*] See notation from
Environment
(3.2.3).
False
requireToolQualiﬁcation String [*] See require-
ToolQualiﬁcation
from Environ-
ment (3.2.3).
False
hardwareInvolved String [1..*] See hardwareIn-
volved from Envi-
ronment (3.2.3).
False
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4.3.4 «FeedbackMechanism»
Description
The «FeedbackMechanism» stereotype enable the speciﬁcation of the way that feedback is
provided by a process of the software life cycle to another.
Related concept
See FeedbackMechanism (3.2.4).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description String [1] See description
from Feedback-
Mechanism
(3.2.4).
False
method String [1] See method from
FeedbackMecha-
nism (3.2.4).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
prioritySystem String [1] See prioritySys-
tem from Feed-
backMechanism
(3.2.4).
False
changeApprovalSystem String [1] See changeAp-
provalSystem
from Feedback-
Mechanism
(3.2.4).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
destinatingProcess Association [1] See from Feed-
backMechanism
(3.2.4).
«Process»
sourceProcess Association [1] See source-
Process from
FeedbackMech-
anism (3.2.4).
«Process»
4.3.5 «Objective»
Description
The «Objective» stereotype represents the requirements that should be met in order to demon-
strate compliance with the standard (RTCA, 2011a).
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Related concept
See Objective (3.2.5).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description ObjectiveType [1] See description
from Objective
(3.2.5).
False
isSatisﬁed Boolean [1] See isStatisﬁed
from Objective
(3.2.5).
False
minimumApplicabilityLevel SoftwareLevel [1] See minimumAp-
plicabilityLevel
from Objective
(3.2.5).
False
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Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed
member
end
achieves Association [1..*] See achieves from Objec-
tive (3.2.5).
«Activity»
4.3.6 «Process»
Description
The «Process» stereotype represents a collection of activities performed in the software life
cycle to produce various outputs or the software product (RTCA, 2011a) and to enable the
achievement of a set of objectives.
Related concept
See Process (3.2.6).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description String [1] See description
from Process
(3.2.6).
False
type ProcessType [1] See type from Pro-
cess (3.2.6).
False
/isComplete Boolean [1] See isComplete
from Process
(3.2.6).
True
allowPartialInput Boolean [1] See allowPartial-
Input from Pro-
cess (3.2.6).
False
organizationalResponsibility Actor [1] See organization-
alResponsibility
from Process
(3.2.6).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
contains Association [1..*] See performs
from Process
(3.2.6).
«Activity»
sourceProcess Association [*] See sourcePro-
cess from Process
(3.2.6).
«FeedbackMechanism»
deﬁnes Association [1..*] See deﬁnes from
Process (3.2.6).
«TransitionCriterion»
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
objectives Association [1..*] See objectives
from Process
(3.2.6).
«Objective»
uses Association [1..*] See uses from Pro-
cess (3.2.6).
«Environment»
outputs Association [1..*] See outputs from
Process (3.2.6).
«SoftwareLifeCycleData»
inputs Association [1..*] See inputs from
Process (3.2.6).
«SoftwareLifeCycleData»
relateTo Association [*] See relateTo from
Process (3.2.6).
«Deviation»
Constraints
See Process (3.2.6).
4.3.7 «SimulationEnvironment»
Description
The «SimulationEnvironment» stereotype describes the environment used for simulation pur-
pose.
Related concept
See SimulationEnvironment (3.2.7).
Generalizations
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Parent class name Explanation
«SoftwareTestEnvironment» A simulation environment is a specialization
of the «Environment» stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
simulatorLimit String [1..*] See simulatorLimit
from SimulationEn-
vironment (3.2.7).
False
simulatorCapability String [1..*] See simulator-
Capability from
SimulationEnviron-
ment (3.2.7).
False
Constraints
See SimulationEnvironment (3.2.7).
4.3.8 «SoftwareDevelopmentEnvironment»
Description
The «SoftwareDevelopmentEnvironment» stereotype speciﬁes various information related to
the software development environment.
Related concept
See SoftwareDevelopmentEnvironment (3.2.8).
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Generalizations
Parent class name Explanation
«Environment» A software development environment is a spe-
cialization of the «Environment» stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
programmingLanguage String [1..*] See program-
mingLanguage
from SoftwareDe-
velopmentEnvi-
ronment (3.2.8).
False
compiler String [1..*] See complier
from SoftwareDe-
velopmentEnvi-
ronment (3.2.8).
False
assumption String [1..*] See assumption
from SoftwareDe-
velopmentEnvi-
ronment (3.2.8).
False
requirementDevelopmentMethod String [1] See requirement-
Development-
Method from
SoftwareDevel-
opmentEnviron-
ment (3.2.8).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
designMethod String [1..*] See design-
Method from
SoftwareDevel-
opmentEnviron-
ment (3.2.8).
False
codingMethod String [1..*] See coding-
Method from
SoftwareDevel-
opmentEnviron-
ment (3.2.8).
False
linker String [1..*] See linker from
SoftwareDevel-
opmentEnviron-
ment (3.2.8).
False
4.3.9 «SoftwareLifeCycle»
Description
The «SoftwareLifeCycle» stereotype represents the ordered collection of processes that is consid-
ered sufﬁcient and appropriate by an organization to produce a software product (RTCA,2011a).
The software life cycle is deﬁned by identifying the activities for each process, specifying a
sequence for the processes (through transition criterion) and assigning responsibilities for the
processes and as such for the activities.
Related concept
See SoftwareLifeCycle (3.2.9).
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Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
appliedSupplement DO178CSupplement [0..4] See ap-
pliedSupple-
ment from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
targetedSoftwareLevel SoftwareLevel [1..*] See tar-
getedSoft-
warelevel
from Soft-
wareLifeCy-
cle (3.2.9).
False
singleLevelOfRequirements Boolean [1] See sin-
gleLevel-
OfRequire-
ment from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
previouslyDeveloped- Soft-
ware
Boolean [1] See previ-
ouslyDevel-
opedSoft-
ware from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
multipleVersionDissimilar-
Software
Boolean [1] See mul-
tipleVer-
sionDis-
similarSoft-
ware from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
userModiﬁableSoftware Boolean [1] See user-
Modiﬁ-
ableSoft-
ware from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
paramaterDataItemFile Boolean [1] See parame-
terDataItem-
File from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
deactivatedCode Boolean [1] See de-
activated-
Code from
Software-
LifeCycle
(3.2.9).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed
member
end
isComposedOf Association [1..*] See isComposedOf from
SoftwareLifeCycle (3.2.9).
«Process»
Constraints
See SoftwareLifeCycle (3.2.9).
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4.3.10 «SoftwareLifeCycleData»
Description
The «SoftwareLifeCycleData» stereotype represents the documents that compile the data that
have to be produced during the processes of the software life cycle. Such data are used to obtain
certiﬁcation of the software product and for post certiﬁcation changes occurring to the software.
Examples of produced data include requirements speciﬁcation (SRD), requirements standards
(SRS), plan for software aspects of certiﬁcation (PSAC), software development plan (SDP), bug
reports, test results (SVR), etc. DO-178C does not impose a speciﬁc form for the representation
of these data.
Related concept
See SoftwareLifeCycleData (3.2.10).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Artifact Artifact is the speciﬁcation of a physical piece of information
that is used or produced by a software development process. As
such, «SoftwareLifeCycleData» represents any of the develop-
ment deliverables that are required by DO-178C.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
type SoftwareLifeCycleDataType [1] See type from
SoftwareLifeCy-
cleData (3.2.10).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
controlCategory ControlCategory [1] See control-
Category from
SoftwareLifeCy-
cleData (3.2.10).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed
member
end
isProducedBy Association [1] See isProcudedBy from Soft-
wareLifeCycleData (3.2.10).
«Activity»
4.3.11 «SoftwareTestEnvironment»
Description
The «SoftwareTestEnvironment» stereotype speciﬁes various information related to the used
testing environments.
Related concept
See SoftwareTestEnvironment (3.2.11).
Generalizations
Parent class name Explanation
«Environment» A software test environment is a specializa-
tion of the «Environment» stereotype.
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Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
differenceWithTargetComputer String [1..*] See difference-
WithTargetCom-
puter from
SoftwareTestEn-
vironment
(3.2.11).
False
testTargetPlatform testTarget [1] See testTarget-
Platform from
SoftwareTestEn-
vironment
(3.2.11).
False
testTargetDescription String [1] See testTargetDe-
scription from
SoftwareTestEn-
vironment
(3.2.11).
False
4.3.12 «TransitionCriterion»
Description
The «TransitionCriterion» stereotype represents the minimum conditions deﬁned by the software
planning process to be satisﬁed in order to enter a process (RTCA,2011a).
Related concept
See TransitionCriterion (3.2.12).
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Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
description String [1] See description
from Transi-
tionCriterion
(3.2.12).
False
isSatisﬁed Boolean [1] See isSatisﬁed
from Transi-
tionCriterion
(3.2.12).
False
condition String [1..*] See condition
from Transi-
tionCriterion
(3.2.12).
False
transitFromIncompleteProcess Boolean [1] See transit-
FromIncom-
pleteProcess
from Transi-
tionCriterion
(3.2.12).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
allowReEntrance Boolean [1] See allowReEn-
trance from
TransitionCrite-
rion (3.2.12).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed
member
end
transitionTo Association [1..*] See transitionTo from Transi-
tionCriterion (3.2.12).
«Process»
4.4 Requirements Package
The elements of the conceptual model that are related to the software requirements process
depicted in Figure 3.3 have been mapped to the UML metamodel to produce the Requirements
package of the proﬁle. Figure 4.4 depicts this package.
We remind the reader that we included the concept low-level requirement that pertains to the
speciﬁcation of the software requirements.
The stereotypes of the Requirements package are the following:
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Figure 4.4 Requirements package diagram.
4.4.1 «Derivation»
Description
The «Derivation» stereotype is a relationship that enables the traceability of derived requirements.
It related the derived requirement and the requirement being derived through a bi-directional
trace.
The «Derivation» stereotype represents the relationship derivation from the conceptual model.
Related concept
See Requirement (3.3.4).
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Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Dependency A derivation relationship is used to indicate that a requirement
add missing speciﬁcation details from another. The metaclass
Dependency enables the traceability that the derivation relation-
ship introduces between two requirements.
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A derivation relationship relates two requirements of
the same level.
Software level D None
A derivation relationship relates two requirements,
one of them must have its attribute isDerived set
to "True" while the second must have its attribute
isDerived set to "False".
Software level D None
4.4.2 «HighLevelRequirement»
Description
The «HighLevelRequirement» (HLR) stereotype captures software requirements that are de-
veloped from the analysis of system requirements that allocated to software, safety-related
requirements, and system architecture (RTCA, 2011a).
Related concept
See HighLevelRequirement (3.3.1).
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Generalizations
Parent class name Explanation
«Requirement» A High-level requirement is a specialization
of the «Requirement» stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
precludeSystemHazard Boolean [1] See precludeSys-
temHazard from
HighLevelRequire-
ment (3.3.1).
False
describeDesign Boolean [1] See describeDesign
from HighLevelRe-
quirement (3.3.1).
False
containVeriﬁcationDetail Boolean [1] See containVeriﬁ-
cationDetail from
HighLevelRequire-
ment (3.3.1).
False
Constraints
See HighLevelRequirement (3.3.1).
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4.4.3 «LowLevelRequirement»
Description
The "LowLevelRequirement" (LLR) stereotype captures software requirements that are devel-
oped from the high-level requirements, derived requirements, and design constraints. Low-level
requirements are requirements from which source code can be directly implemented without
further information (RTCA, 2011a).
Related concept
See LowLevelRequirement (3.3.2).
Generalizations
Parent class name Explanation
«Requirement» A low-level requirement is a specialization of
the «Requirement» stereotype.
Constraints
See LowLevelRequirement (3.3.2).
4.4.4 «Rationale»
Description
The «Rationale» stereotype purpose is to provide a justiﬁcation for the decisions made during
the software life cycle.
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Related concept
See Rationale (3.3.3).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Comment A «Rationale» could be attached to any of the
model elements to justify some decision. The
metaclass Comment can be attached to any
metaclass of the UML metamodel.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
type RationaleType [1] See type from Ratio-
nale (3.3.3).
False
Constraints
See Rationale (3.3.3).
4.4.5 «Reﬁnement»
Description
The «Reﬁnement» stereotype is a relationship that enables the bi-directional traceability of a
requirement decomposition into successive lower levels of requirement.
The «Reﬁnement» stereotype has been created from the relationship reﬁnement in the conceptual
model.
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Related concept
See Requirement (3.3.4).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Absraction A reﬁnement indicates a decomposition of a requirement into a lower
level of speciﬁcation. The metaclass Abstraction enables the trace-
ability that the reﬁnement relationship introduces between two re-
quirements.
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A reﬁnement relationship relates two requirements. Software level D None
The following are the allowed relations that a reﬁne-
ment relationship may deﬁne between two require-
ments:
• «SystemRequirement» ←→ «HighLevelRequire-
ment»
• «HighLevelRequirement» ←→ «LowLevelRe-
quirement»
• «LowLevelRequirement»←→ «LowLevelRequire-
ment»
Software level D None
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4.4.6 «Requirement»
Description
The «Requirement» stereotype is an abstract stereotype that generalizes all kind of requirements
deﬁned by DO-178C (i.e. SRATS,HLR and LLR). A requirement’s purpose is to describe what
is to be performed by the system, or the software given a set of inputs and constraints (RTCA,
2011a).
Related concept
See Requirement (3.3.4).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
id String [1] See id from Require-
ment (3.3.4).
False
text String [1] See text from Re-
quirement (3.3.4).
False
type RequirementType [1] See type from Re-
quirement (3.3.4).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
isDerived Boolean [1] See isDerived from
Requirement (3.3.4).
false
isStable Boolean [1] See isStable from Re-
quirement (3.3.4).
False
status RequirementStatus [1] See status from Re-
quirement (3.3.4).
False
isVeriﬁable Boolean [1] See isVeriﬁable from
Requirement (3.3.4).
False
isConsistent Boolean [1] See isConsistent
from Requirement
(3.3.4).
False
isFormalizable Boolean [1] See isFormalizable
from Requirement
(3.3.4).
False
formalDescription String [0..1] See formalDescrip-
tion from Require-
ment (3.3.4).
False
Constraints
See Requirement (3.3.4).
4.4.7 «Satisfaction»
Description
The «Satisfaction» stereotype is a relationship that enables the traceability between a requirement
and the model elements that implement the said requirement.
126
The «Satisfaction» stereotype has been created from the relationship satisfaction in the concep-
tual model.
Related concept
See Requirement (3.3.4).
Extensions
Base Metaclass Explanation
Dependency A derivation relationship is used to indicate that a require-
ment add missing speciﬁcation details from another. The
metaclass Dependency enables the traceability that the
derivation relationship introduces between two require-
ments.
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
A satisfaction relationship relates a high-level re-
quirement or a low-level requirement to any element
of the design.
Software level D None
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4.4.8 «SystemRequirement»
Description
The "SystemRequirement" (SRAT) stereotype captures requirements that describe at the system
level the functionality that the system, as a whole, must fulﬁll in order to satisfy the stakeholders
needs.
Related concept
See SystemRequirement (3.3.5).
Generalizations
Parent class name Explanation
«Requirement» A system requirement is a specialization of
the «Requirement» stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
allocatedToSoftware Boolean [1] See allocatedToSoft-
ware from SystemRe-
quirement (3.3.5).
False
4.5 Veriﬁcation Package
The elements of the conceptual model that are related to to the software veriﬁcation process
depicted in Figure 3.4 have been mapped to the UML metamodel to produce the Veriﬁcation
package of the proﬁle. Figure 4.5 depicts this package.
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Figure 4.5 Veriﬁcation proﬁle diagram.
The stereotypes of the Veriﬁcation Package are the following:
4.5.1 «Analysis»
Description
The «Analysis» stereotype is used to deﬁne an analysis. They provide repeatable evidences of
correctness for the element(s) under scrutiny.
Related concept
See Analysis (3.4.1).
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Extensions
Base Metaclasse Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
id String [1] See id from Anal-
ysis (3.4.1).
False
scope String [1] See scope from
Analysis (3.4.1).
False
method String [1] See method from
Analysis (3.4.1).
False
target «Objective» [1] See target from
Analysis (3.4.1).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
produces Association [1] Speciﬁes the re-
sult of the analy-
sis.
«Result»
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4.5.2 «Result»
Description
The «Result» stereotype captures the information resulting from an analysis or a review.
Related concept
See Result (3.4.2).
Extensions
Base Metaclasse Explanation
Class The class metaclass allows us to represent any
object without capturing unnecessary seman-
tic of the UML metamodel that is not relevant
for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
result String [1..*] See result from Result
(3.4.2).
False
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4.5.3 «Review»
Description
The «Review» stereotype deﬁnes a review. They are used to provide a qualitative assessment of
correctness for the element(s) under scrutiny. Requirements, test cases, test procedures, analyses
and reviews can be reviewed.
Related concept
See Review (3.4.3).
Extensions
Base Metaclasse Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
id String [1] See id from Re-
view (3.4.3).
False
scope String [1] See scope from
Review (3.4.3).
False
method String [1] See method from
Review (3.4.3).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
target «Objective» [1] See target from
Review (3.4.3).
False
requireAdditionalTest Boolean [1] See requireAddi-
tionalTest from
Review (3.4.3).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed member end
produces Association [1] Speciﬁes the re-
sult of the review.
«Result»
4.5.4 «TestCase»
Description
The «TestCase» is a stereotype that represents the set of inputs, execution conditions and
expected results developed for a particular testing objective. Examples of testing objectives
include the execution of a speciﬁc program path or the veriﬁcation of compliance against a
speciﬁc requirement.
Related concept
See TestCase (3.4.4).
Extensions
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Base Metaclasse Explanation
Class The class metaclass allows us to represent any
object without capturing unnecessary seman-
tic of the UML metamodel that is not relevant
for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
id String [1] See id from Test-
Case (3.4.4).
False
purpose String [1] See purpose from
TestCase (3.4.4).
False
passFailCriterion String [1] See passFailCri-
terion from Test-
Case (3.4.4).
False
expectedResult String [1] See expecte-
dResult from
TestCase (3.4.4).
False
testingLevel TestingMethod [1] See testingLevel
from TestCase
(3.4.4).
False
type TestType [1] See type from
TestCase (3.4.4).
False
Associations
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed mem-
ber end
carriesOut Association [1..*] See carriesOut from
TestCase (3.4.4).
«TestProcedure»
4.5.5 «TestProcedure»
Description
The «TestProcedure» stereotype deﬁnes a test procedure. A test procedure provides the detailed
instructions for the set-up and execution of a given test case, along with the instructions required
for the evaluation of the related test case execution results.
Related concept
See TestProcedure (3.4.5).
Extensions
Base Metaclasse Explanation
Class The metaclass Class allows us to represent
any object without capturing unnecessary se-
mantic of the UML metamodel that is not
relevant for the introduced stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
id String [1] See id from Test-
Procedure (3.4.5).
False
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Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
executionInstruction String [1] See executionIn-
struction from
TestProcedure
(3.4.5).
False
resultEvaluationMethod String [1] See resultEvalua-
tionMethod from
TestProcedure
(3.4.5).
False
uses «SoftwareTest-
Environment»
[1] See uses from
TestProcedure
(3.4.5).
False
Associations
Name Type Multiplicity Description Opposed mem-
ber end
carriesOut Association [1] See carriesOut
from TestProcedure
(3.4.5).
«TestCase»
produces Association [1] See procudes from
TestProcedure
(3.4.5).
«TestResult»
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4.5.6 «TestResult»
Description
The «TestResult» stereotype provides the resulting information related to a test case execution.
The test results are meant to be compared with the expected test results provided by the test case
in order to evaluate the results of the execution of the related test case.
Related concept
See TestResult 3.4.6.
Genezalizations
Parent Class name Explanation
«Result» A test result is a specialization of the «Result»
stereotype.
Attributes
Name Type Multiplicity Description Is derived
verdict Verdict [1] See verdict from TestRe-
sult (3.4.6).
False
4.5.7 «Veriﬁcation»
Description
The «Veriﬁcation» stereotype deﬁnes the relationship that is used as a traceability mean between
test cases, test procedures, review or analysis and the element under veriﬁcation.
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Related concept
See TestCase, Analysis and Review.
Extensions
Base Metaclasse Explanation
Dependency A derivation relationship is used to indicate that a requirement add
missing speciﬁcation details from another. The metaclass Dependency
enables the traceability that the derivation relationship introduces
between two requirements.
Constraints
Constraint description Software level Introduced by
supplement
The client of a veriﬁcation relationship should be a
test case, a review or an analysis.
Software level D None

CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY - THE LANDING GEAR CONTROL SOFTWARE
To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed proﬁle, we applied the proﬁle to a realistic case
study: the landing gear control software (LGCS). The LGCS (Paz & El Boussaidi, 2017) has
been developed and adapted from the case study proposed by Boniol & Wiels (2014). The
objective of this case study is to develop a speciﬁcation that is consistent with the practices
related to safety-critical software development in the avionic domain. It speciﬁcally aims
at being compliant with DO-178C. For this purpose, this case study has been developed by
following the best practices compiled in the requirements engineering handbook (Lempia &
Miller, 2009) and in respect of the guidelines provided by DO-178C and its supplements.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents the implementation of the proﬁle
within an UML modeling environment. In Section 5.2, we demonstrate how the proﬁle can be
used to support the modeling of the LGCS case study. In particular, we illustrate the usefulness
of our proﬁle through the usage scenarios that were identiﬁed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3).
5.1 Tool support
To provide an appropriate support for implementing our proﬁle, we identiﬁed the following as
the requirements that have to be satisﬁed by a UML modeling tool:
• Allow the creation of UML proﬁles and their integration within the tool.
• Allow the creation of new diagram types to support the speciﬁcation diagram, the planning
diagram and the veriﬁcation diagram introduced by our proﬁle.
• Support the validation of constraints to verify the correctness the proﬁle’s stereotypes usage.
• Allow the customization of the messages resulting from violated constraints.
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In the following, we describe brieﬂy the UML tool we used to implement our proﬁle and the
steps of the implementation process.
5.1.1 Papyrus
Among the existing tools that meet the aforementioned requirements, we have chosen Papyrus 1
as the UML environment in which we implement our proﬁle. Papyrus is an open source, general
purpose UML modeling tool. Papyrus is compliant with the UML 2.5 speciﬁcation, as such it
provides support for all UML diagrams including the proﬁle diagram. Papyrus is built upon
the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF). Papyrus is provided as a set of plug-ins to leverage
Eclipse software components in order to provide an efﬁcient environment for modeling activities
using the UML language. It provides support for source code generation (Java, C++) from UML
models. It also provides model validation through EMF validation framework. Furthermore, it
provides support for other OMG standards such as SysML, MARTE, BPMN, fUML, and PSCS.
Finally, it facilitates the implementation of DSMLs based on UML proﬁles.
In order to ease the integration of DSMLs, Papyrus provides a set of extension points that can
be used by proﬁle designers to integrate their proﬁles within Papyrus. Eclipse plug-ins are the
encapsulation of a set of behaviors that interact with each other in order to form a new running
environment. Plug-ins are built in order to extend the behavior of the eclipse platform using
various extension points to register their customized behavior. Extension points are the interfaces
provided by a plug-in to allow new plug-ins to further customize or extend the behavior of the
environment. An extension point is a contract that the extending plug-in conform to.
In the context of our work, we have been working with Papyrus "Neon" release (version 2.0.x).
To implement and integrate our proﬁle within the Papyrus environment we have studied the
implementation of the SysML proﬁle provided by Papyrus2. As an additional resource, the
1 Papyrus: https://eclipse.org/papyrus/
2 The SysML Papyrus git: http://git.eclipse.org/c/papyrus/org.eclipse.papyrus-sysml.git/
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developers of Papyrus provide a library project example 3 that serves as an example for the
deﬁnition and the integration of a UML proﬁle within papyrus.
5.1.2 Implementing the DO-178C proﬁle
Papyrus offers a built-in mechanism to create and integrate a UML proﬁle within its environment.
The process of implementing a UML proﬁle within Papyrus can be decomposed into two steps.
The ﬁrst consists in creating the proﬁle model. The second step consists in creating the plug-ins
that are in charge of the integration of the proﬁle within the modeling environment.
5.1.2.1 Step 1: Creation of the Proﬁle Model
To create a UML proﬁle, Papyrus provides a proﬁle diagram. The proﬁle diagram allows
designers to create stereotypes, declare their attributes, the relationships that exist between
stereotypes and to specify the base metaclasses of stereotypes. Figure 5.1 shows the Papyrus
wizard for creating new proﬁle. Figure 5.2 shows the Papyrus environment workbench with the
proﬁle diagram view opened showing the Requirements package of the DO-178C proﬁle.
Figure 5.1 Papyrus create new model wizard.
3 The library proﬁle example: http://git.eclipse.org/c/papyrus/org.eclipse.papyrus.git/tree/examples/
library?h=streams/2.0-maintenance
142
Figure 5.2 Papyrus interface, proﬁle diagram view.
5.1.2.2 Step 2: Integrating the proﬁle within the Papyrus tool
To make the proﬁle available as part of the Papyrus tool, we have to create a number of Eclipse
plug-ins which extend and customize Papyrus plug-ins. We organized these plug-ins into a
structure that is similar to the one used in the SysML proﬁle project. The created plug-ins are
organized according to the following structure:
• Core: The core folder contains the plug-ins that are used to register a proﬁle within Papyrus.
Their purpose is to provide the environment with the deﬁnition of the proﬁle, the proﬁle’s
constraints and the necessary constructs to manipulate the concepts of the proposed proﬁle
as EMF model.
• Diagram: The diagram folder contains the plug-ins that are in charge of the deﬁnition
of new diagrams, their associated graphical notations and restrictions within the Papyrus
environment.
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• GUI: The GUI folder contains the plug-ins that have an impact on the environment in term
of the graphical interface such as the property view for a proﬁle’s stereotype and icons used
in various menus.
• Papyrus: The Papyrus folder contains the plug-ins that are modiﬁed versions of the plug-ins
as distributed by Papyrus.
Thus, once the proﬁle diagram is created, we use Papyrus to generate the implementation of the
entities contained in the proﬁle. Papyrus relies on the EMF code generator. The generated code
is part of the Core folder. To use the generated implementation of the proﬁle, we identiﬁed the
proﬁle as a namespace and registered that namespace in the EMF global package registry. This
is done through extension points deﬁned by Papyrus.
Once we registered the proﬁle, we deﬁned extensions to customize the graphical interface of
Papyrus to enable the user to select the proﬁle, visualize the proﬁle’s speciﬁc viewpoint and
create the proﬁle’s diagrams. It is worth mentioning that we deﬁned four templates within our
proﬁle to customize the software life cycle diagram according to the software level. In other
words, the proﬁle user can choose a given template and the proﬁle will create an initialized
software life cycle diagram which conforms to the software level of the chosen template.
Once all extensions are done, the user can launch Papyrus and create a model that uses the
DO-178C proﬁle (Figure 5.3). The user can then select a template corresponding to the software
level of his model or select directly the diagrams he wishes to include in his model (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.5 shows the DO-178C view with a requirement diagram. The details of this second
step are described in Annex III.
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Figure 5.3 Papyrus create new model wizard
selecting the DO-178C proﬁle.
Figure 5.4 Papyrus create new model wizard
selecting the diagram kind.
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Figure 5.5 Papyrus view of the DO-178C requirement diagram.
5.2 Using the DO-178C proﬁle to model an avionic software
In this section, we ﬁrst give an overview of the avionic software that we used to assess the
usefulness of the DO-178C proﬁle. We illustrate the usage of the proﬁle through four use case
scenarios that were identiﬁed in Chapter 2.
5.2.1 Landing Gear Control Software - Overview
The landing gear control software (LGCS) is in charge of the actuation of an aircraft’s landing
gear system. A landing gear system is composed of three gears that are retractable in order to
enable taking off and landing maneuvers of an aircraft. These wheels assemblies are arranged in
a triangle conﬁguration in order to support the aircraft’s weight while it remains on the ground.
Two of these assemblies are located under the wings and the remaining one is located under the
aircraft’s nose. Figure 5.6 shows the undercarriage conﬁguration of a landing gear system as
viewed from the front of the aircraft. Once the plane has taken off, each gear is retracted into its
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respective compartment. These compartments, in which the gears are concealed, have doors
that are opened and closed upon extension or retraction of the gears.
Right Main Gear
Right Main Door
Shock
Absorber
Left Main Gear
Left Main Door
Shock
Absorber
Nose Gear
Nose Door
Shock
Absorber
Figure 5.6 Front view of an aircraft undercarriage conﬁguration. Extracted from
Paz & El Boussaidi (2017).
There are two distinct sequences for the gears motion, the extension of the gears for the landing
phase of the ﬂight and its opposite sequence, retraction of the gears after take off. The extension
of the gears allowing landing of the aircraft, consists in the opening of the gear’s compartment
doors followed by the extension of the gear. The opposite sequence happens once the aircraft has
taken off and enters its climbing phase, the gears are retracted into their respective compartment
followed by the closing of the compartment’s doors. Figure 5.7, provides a view of the retraction
sequence for one of the gears.
Actuation of the gears is performed through a hydraulic circuit that is controlled by a set
of electro-valves that regulate the pressure in the segment of the circuit they control. The
hydraulic circuit is controlled by ﬁve-electro-valves. One general electro-valve is in charge of
the pressurization of the whole circuit while four speciﬁc electro-valves are in charge of further
tuning the pressure in subsections of the circuit in order to open the doors, close the doors,
extend the gears and retract the gears.
A pilot interface is provided in the cockpit to enter the desired motion of the gears. This interface
is comprised of a lever that has two positions: up and down, respectively to retract the gears and
147
Gear extended
Door
open
Gear in transit
Gear retracted
Door closed
Door closed
Shock
Absorber
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.7 Phases of the retraction sequence: (a) extended gear, (b) gear in
transit, and (c) retracted gear. Extracted from Paz & El Boussaidi (2017).
to extend the gears. The pilot indicates the desired motion to be performed by moving the lever
up or down. To notify the pilot about the state of the system, the interface comes with a set of
colored lights. A green light indicates that the system is functioning normally as deﬁned by its
requirements, an amber light indicates that the gears are in transit and the system is functioning
normally, ﬁnally a red light indicates that a failure of the system has been recorded and the
system is no longer functioning. To prevent accidental actuation requests, the system contains
an analogical switch that enables and disables the stimulation of the electro-valves. The switch
mechanically closes each time the position of the lever changes, thus enabling the subsequent
stimulation of the electro-valves.
The landing gear system contains a set of 17 sensors for monitoring the state of each component
of the system. These sensors include one sensor to monitor the analogical switch state, one
sensor to read the pressure of the hydraulic circuit, two sensors per gear to evaluate their position,
two sensors per door to determine their position, and three sensors (one per gear) to determine
whether the gear shock absorbers are relaxed. Each sensor reading is performed three times and
these readings are subdued to a voting process prior to determine the state and the value of each
sensor reading.
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The behavior of the physical system is controlled, and monitored by the landing gear controller
software (LGCS). The controller is in charge of communicating with the entities that constitute
the landing gear system. It is responsible for the monitoring activity of the system’s state in
order to provide the pilot with feedback about the current state of the system (e.g. gears being
in transition, system failure). Upon request from the pilot, the controller will send speciﬁc
commands to the system’s electro-valves to perform the requested actuation of the landing gears.
Figure 5.8 provides a contextual view of the various relations that exist between the system
entities and the software controller.
Landing Gear System
Pilot Interface
Digital Controller
running the
Landing Gear Control Software
Desired Gear 
Position
Gear Lever
Gear Position 
and System 
State Indicator
Desired Gear
Position
Feedback
Feedback
Analogical 
Switch
closes
Analogical 
Switch Sensor
triggers
Analogical 
Switch Status
Actuation 
Commands
Gears and 
Doors
Gears and 
Doors Sensors
move
trigger
Gears and 
Doors Statuses
Hydraulic Circuit 
Pressure Sensor
trigger
Hydraulic Circuit 
Pressure
Pilot / Copilot
General 
Electro-Valve
Specific 
Electro-Valves
Actuation 
Commands
Hydraulic 
Circuit
pressurizes
Figure 5.8 The LGCS operational context. Extracted from Paz & El Boussaidi
(2017).
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5.2.2 Use case 1: Specifying the software life cycle of the LGCS
The software planning process deﬁnes the means that are used in order to produce a software
product that complies with its airworthiness requirements and the targeted software level. In
order to specify the software life cycle that will drive the development of the LGCS, we use the
stereotypes deﬁned in the LifeCycle package of the proposed proﬁle. These stereotypes and
their associated constraints allow to specify the set of processes, objectives, and activities that
together form a DO-178C compliant software life cycle for the LGCS targeted software level.
Figure 5.9 shows the DO-178C proﬁle viewpoint with an excerpt of the LGCS software life
cycle. In the following we present in details the main concepts that we modeled in the LGCS
software life cycle.
Figure 5.9 Example of a model of the software planning process.
The LGCS software life cycle is speciﬁed by using the «SoftwareLifeCyleStereotype» as
observed in Figure 5.10. The development of the LGCS shall be performed by exercising the
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activities that DO-178C deﬁnes for software that target an assurance level of C. Because the
design of LGCS is done using UML, the development of the LGCs is guided by the guidelines
provided by DO-331 and DO-332 respectively dealing with model-based development and
object-oriented technologies. The speciﬁcation of the target software level and the applicable
supplements enable the proﬁle to adjust the set of constraints that have to be veriﬁed in order
to validate the model. The LGCS software life cycle is composed of the following processes:
planning process, software requirements process, software design process, software coding
process, integration process, software veriﬁcation process, software quality assurance process,
software conﬁguration management process, and the certiﬁcation liaison process. Additionally,
the LGCS software life cycle captures further information that impact the evidence that have to
be produced for certiﬁcation of the software product. Among those, the software requirements
for the LGCS are deﬁned using multiple levels of requirements meaning that both HLRs and
LLRs will be developed from the system requirements allocated to software. Additionally, the
LGCS does not use parameter data item ﬁles. The LGCS is not a multiple version dissimilar
software. For its development, the LGCS does not use previously developed software. Finally,
the LGCS is not a user modiﬁable software. As such no additional certiﬁcation evidence is
required in relation to these properties of the software.
Figure 5.10 Speciﬁcation of the software life cycle.
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The software planning process as deﬁned for the LGCS is provided in Figure 5.11. The
planning process is responsible for the deﬁnition of the complete software life cycle guiding
the development of the LGCS, thus deﬁning the activities and objectives to be met during the
development of the LGCS for each of the processes that constitute the software life cycle. The
planning process does not receive data as input, however it produces outputs that are used for
demonstrating compliance in order to certify the software product. The documents gathering the
data produced during the planning are the software veriﬁcation plan (SVP), the plan for software
aspects of certiﬁcation (PSAC), the software development plan (SDP), the software conﬁguration
management plan (SCMP), the software quality assurance plan (SQAP), the software design
standards (SDS), the software code standards (SCS), the software requirements standards (SRS),
the software veriﬁcation results (SVS), and the software model standards (SMS). The software
planning process is deemed complete upon approval of the PSAC, the SDS, the SDP, and the
SVP by the certifying authorities. Upon completion of the software planning process, the
speciﬁcation of the software requirements shall begin as part of the software requirements
process. The project leader is responsible for the activities of the planning process that result in
the speciﬁcation of the LGCS life cycle.
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a) Software Planning Process
b) Transition criterion
Figure 5.11 The software planning process and its apportioned transition criterion.
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Figure 5.12 provides the deﬁnition of the software requirement process as deﬁned for the
LGCS and the transition criteria that applies to the software requirement process. The software
requirement process shall lead to the deﬁnition of the high-level requirements that are to be
contained in the Software Requirements Data. These HLRs are developed from the inputs
received by the process (i.e. the system architecture, the hardware interfaces, and the system
requirements allocated to software). The requirement process has 3 objectives. Among those,
objective 5.1.1.a (depicted in Figure 5.13.a) is to develop the high-level requirements and is
applicable for any software level higher than software level D. These objectives are achieved by
performing 13 activities, among which activity 5.1.2.c (depicted in Figure 5.13.b) states that
each SRATS have to be speciﬁed in the HLRs. Upon completion of the activities of the software
requirements process, transition to the software design process can be done only once reviews
and conformance checks against the software requirements standards are performed.
a) Software Requirements Process b) Transition criterion
Figure 5.12 The software requirement process and its apportioned transition
criterion.
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a) b)
Figure 5.13 An objective (a) and an activity (b) of the software requirement process.
The proﬁle deﬁnes constraints to help in the speciﬁcation of the entities that constitute the
software life cycle. Constraints verify the correct assignment of objectives to a process and
the deﬁnition of the activities that are related to an objective. Furthermore the constraints also
verify that the correct documents required by DO-178C are received and emitted by the relevant
processes. Examples of these constraints are:
• Software level D: The software requirements process shall contain the activity "5.1.2.a".
This constraint is applicable to software targeting software level D and higher.
• Software level D: The software requirements process shall contain the objective "5.1.1.a".
This constraint is applicable to software targeting software level D and higher.
• Software level D: The software requirements process shall output the following document:
Software Requirements Data. This constraint is applicable to software targeting software
level D and higher.
• Software level D: The software requirements process shall receive the following input:
System Requirements. This constraint is applicable to software targeting software level D
and higher.
We modiﬁed the previous requirements process (Figure 5.12.a) to remove activity 5.1.2.a and
objective 5.1.1.a from the process speciﬁcation. We then launched the veriﬁcation of the LGCS
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model and the proﬁle identiﬁed the violated constraints as shown in Figure 5.14. From the
guidance provided by the violated constraint(s), the software designer may proceed to adjust the
speciﬁed software life cycle in order to ﬁll the missing information, or to perform the necessary
correction in order to be compliant with DO-178C.
Figure 5.14 Examples of violated constraints for the software requirement process.
Figure 5.15 provides the speciﬁcation of the LGCS software design process and its transition
criteria. Upon completion of the design process, the software architecture and the low-level
requirements are developed from the high-level requirements received as input in the software
requirements data. The activities of the design process are placed under the responsibility of the
software engineer. The design process is composed of 14 activities that achieve 3 objectives.
The output of the design process includes the software architecture and the detailed description
of the design. These are contained in the software design description document. The design
process is deemed complete once all of the problems that relate to the outputs of the design
process reported by the veriﬁcation process are addressed.
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a) Software Design Process b) Transition criterion
Figure 5.15 The software design process and its apportioned transition criterion.
Figure 5.16 provides the speciﬁcation of the software veriﬁcation process as deﬁned for the
LGCS. No transition criterion have been allocated to the software veriﬁcation process because its
activities are performed in parallel with the other processes of the software life cycle. It has 36
objectives. No activities are assigned to the process. This is due to the way DO-178C guidelines
related to the software veriﬁcation process are written. Indeed the document is written in a way
that only declares the objectives of the process and not its activities. As such the objectives of
the process are also its activities. The veriﬁcation process receives data from the processes of the
life cycle. Receiving the system requirements along with the software requirements (Software
Requirements Data), the software architecture (Software Design Description), the source code,
the executable object code and the Software veriﬁcation Plan. The test cases and procedures
that are developed and executed to verify the correct implementation of the software are deﬁned
in the Software Veriﬁcation Cases and Procedures. The results of the executed test cases, the
performed analyses and reviews are contained in the Software Veriﬁcation Results.
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Figure 5.16 The software veriﬁcation process.
5.2.3 Use case 2: Specifying requirements
Because the speciﬁcation of the landing gear control software contains a large number of
software requirements (18 HLRs and 76 LLRs), we focused on a subset of these requirements
to show how the proﬁle can be used to capture relevant DO-178C evidences. Thus, out of the
18 high-level requirements that are used to specify the landing gear controller, we used the
ﬁve high-level requirements shown in table 5.1 and a subset of their reﬁnement into low-level
requirements (two) shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.1 Subset of the LGCS High-level requirements.
Extracted from Paz & El Boussaidi (2017).
ID Description Traces
HLR-1 When the LGCS receives data from one of the LGCS sensors,
the LGCS shall process the three Readings associated to
the sensor data based on the following rules [. . . ] (the rules
are not shown due to the length of the constraint).
SRATS-1
HLR-4 When the LGCS is currently executing a retraction sequence
and a Down value is received for the Desired Gear
Position, the LGCS shall halt the current retraction se-
quence and revert all the actions that were executed. Like-
wise, when the LGCS is currently executing an extension
sequence and an Up value is received for the Desired
Gear Position, the LGCS shall halt the current exten-
sion sequence and revert all the actions that were executed.
SRATS-4
LLR-35
HLR-6 Once the overall value of the Hydraulic Circuit
Pressure is greater than or equal to 30,000 kPa
and less than 35,000 kPa after the General EV
Actuation Command is set to Open, the lgcs can set
to Open the necessary speciﬁc EV (i.e. Door Closing
EV Actuation Command, Door Opening EV
Actuation Command, Gear Retraction EV
Actuation Command or Gear Extension EV
Actuation Command).
SRATS-6
LLR-14
LLR-43
LLR-44
LLR-45
HLR-7 Once at least 0.2 seconds have elapsed since the General
EV Actuation Command was set to Open, the LGCS
can set to Open the Door Opening EV Actuation
Command.
SRATS-7
LLR-14
LLR-46
HLR-12 Once 2 seconds have elapsed since the General EV
Actuation Command was set to Open and the overall
value of the Hydraulic Circuit Pressure is still
less than 30,000 kPa, the LGCS shall detect a failure of
the general hydraulic electro-valve and halt the currently
executing sequence.
SRATS-12
LLR-44
LLR-56
LLR-57
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Table 5.2 Subset of the LGCS low-level requirements.
Extracted from Paz & El Boussaidi (2017).
ID Description Reﬁnes
LLR-44 If the waitForHydraulicPressure method is ac-
tive and the overall value of the Hydraulic Circuit
Pressuremonitorable variable is less than 30,000 kPa, the
waitForHydraulicPressure method shall remain
active until the PressurizationTimeoutEvent is
raised.
HLR-6
HLR-12
LLR-56 If the waitForHydraulicPressure method is ac-
tive and 2 seconds have elapsed since the General
EV Actuation Command was set to Open, the
PressurizationTimeoutEvent shall be raised.
HLR-12
Through its Requirements package the proposed proﬁle allows to specify the system require-
ments that are allocated to software by using the «SystemRequirement» stereotype and to
specify their reﬁnement into high-level requirements using the «HighLevelRequirement»
stereotype. Figure 5.17 shows the use of these two stereotypes along with the «Refinement»
stereotype to specify the decomposition of a system requirement allocated to software into high
level requirements. We can observe that in this example, the reﬁned SRATS is simply reﬁned
into a high-level requirement without modiﬁcation made to its text, meaning that the system
requirement to be complete enough to be considered as a high-level requirement. HLR-4 does
not provide details about the design and does not include veriﬁcation details as prescribed by
DO-178C.
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Figure 5.17 Reﬁnement of a system requirement allocated to software into a
high-level requirement.
In the context of the LGCS, we did not encounter any derived requirements. To show how the pro-
ﬁle supports the speciﬁcation of derived requirements, we use a generic example. Figure 5.18.a
shows two HLRs that are related with the «derivation» association. The attributes isDerived
is automatically computed by the environment based on the existence of a «Derivation»
between two requirements. When we launch the veriﬁcation of this generic model, the proﬁle
identiﬁes a violation of a constraint as shown in Figure 5.18.b. This violation is due to a missing
rationale for the derived requirement. The rationale is required by activity 5.1.2.h for all software
levels.
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a) Derived high-level requirement
b) Violated constraint
Figure 5.18 A derived high-level requirement violating one of the objectives of the
standard.
Finnaly, by using the proposed proﬁle, low-level requirements can be speciﬁed by either using
the «LowLevelRequirement» stereotype (textual speciﬁcation) as shown in Figure 5.19 or as
the proﬁle extends UML, low-level requirements can be speciﬁed using UML design diagram.
As such, multiple low-level requirements may be speciﬁed by a single UML design diagrams.
Figure 5.20 shows an example of UML state machine that implements to the behavior of multiple
low-level requirements, including the low-level requirement speciﬁed in Figure 5.19 (LLR-44).
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Figure 5.19 Low-level requirement 44.
Figure 5.20 The WaitForHydraulicPressure state machine.
5.2.4 Use case 3: Ensuring traceability of software requirements
The goal of this use case is to demonstrate how the proﬁle supports traceability between software
requirements and software design. In the context of DO-178C, software design comprises
software architecture and low-level requirements. In the following, we ﬁrst present the software
163
architecture of the LGCS. Then we discuss the traceability between high-level requirements and
software architecture, and between high-level requirements and low-level requirements.
Software architecture
The architecture of the LGCS is shown on Figure 5.21 as a UML component diagram. The
components that constitute this architecture have been derived from the high-level requirements
that deﬁne the behavior of the LGCS. The architectural design of the LGCS is based on the
process control architectural style in which the system is driven by a set of received inputs that
are used to determine the set of outputs that deﬁne the new state of the system.
Figure 5.21 The landing gear control software architecture.
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The LGCS receives a set of 17 inputs from the sensors that are attached to the physical
entities that interface with the LGCS. These sensors are in charge of monitoring different
part of the system. The SensorManager component is in charge of receiving the inputs
from these sensors. The SequenceController component is in charge of performing
the motion sequence of the landing gears that is requested by the pilot and received from
the external PilotInterface component. Feedback about the overall system state is
also provided to the pilot through the PilotInterfaceManager component that com-
municates with the PilotInterface component. Upon reception of the pilot request, the
SequenceController interacts with the SensorManager to get the sensors readings.
The SensorManager retrieves the values of the sensors and performs a validation of the
obtained values in order to determine the validity of the received data and then transmit the
overall requested values to the SequenceController. The SensorManager compo-
nent also monitors failures that might be occurring in the system and reports those failures
to the OperatingModeManager component. Finally, the SequenceController sends
commands to the EVManager component which in turn sends commands to the external
HydraulicEV component in order to activate the system’s electro-valves allowing actuation
of the landing gears.
Specifying traceability between the high-level requirements and the software architecture
Using the proposed proﬁle, we enable the traceability of the high-level requirement and the
software architecture by using the «Satisfaction» stereotype. This relationship is used to
specify the traces between the requirements and the entities of the architecture or the design that
are responsible for the implementation of the requirements.
Figure 5.22 provides a view of the LGCS architecture as created using the proﬁle. This ﬁgure
shows explicitly the traces between the subset of the LGCS high-level requirements provided in
Table 5.1 and the software components to which they are apportioned. As observed, HLR-1 is
implemented by the SensorManager component while HLR-4, HLR-6, HLR-7 and HLR-12
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are allocated to the SequenceController component. HLR-4 is also allocated to the
PilotInterfaceManager component.
Figure 5.22 A subset of the LGCS HLRs and their related components.
Figure 5.23 shows another view, created using our proﬁle, in which a subset of the software
architecture is depicted. The SequenceController component and the high-level require-
ments it implements are shown along with the class that realizes the SequenceController
component.
166
Figure 5.23 The SequenceController tracing to the high-level requirements it
satisﬁes along with its realizing class.
Specifying traceability from the high-level requirements to the low-level requirements
Using the DO-178C proﬁle, high-level requirements and low-level requirements are speciﬁed in a
similar manner. However HLRs are speciﬁed by the «HighLevelRequirement» stereotype
and LLRs are speciﬁed by the «LowLevelRequirement» stereotype. Traceability between
software requirements is achieved by using the «Refinement», the «Derivation», and
the «Satisfaction» stereotypes.
As our proﬁle is integrated within a UML modeling environment (i.e. Papyrus), LLRs can be
speciﬁed using both UML design diagrams (e.g. state machines) and textual descriptions. Both
speciﬁcations can be traced to HLRs using the proﬁle.
Consider again the LLRs speciﬁed by the waitForHydraulicPressure state machine
presented in Figure 5.20. Because Papyrus does not allow us to add any proﬁle stereotype to
UML state machine diagrams, we used class diagrams to create traceability links between LLRs
and HLRs using our proﬁle when LLRs are speciﬁed as state machines.
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Figure 5.24 provides a view of the traceability between HLR-4 and the elements of the
waitForHydraulicPressure state machine that implement HLR-4. It is implemented
by the transition that raises the RevertEvent that goes to the CloseGEVExit. Figure 5.25
shows the elements of the waitForHydraulicPressure state machine that trace to HLR-
6. Speciﬁcally HLR-6 is implemented by a subset of elements of the waitForHydraulic-
Pressure state machine. It is implemented by the Running state that reads the hydraulic
pressure and checks if it is within the operating range.
Figure 5.24 Elements of the WaitForHydraulicPressure state machine that trace to
HLR-4
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Figure 5.25 Elements of the WaitForHydraulicPressure state machine that trace to
HLR-6.
Figure 5.26 shows an example of LLRs where the LLR (LLR-44) has been speciﬁed using the
«LowLevelRequirement» stereotype introduced by the proﬁle. In this case the traceability
to HLRs is ensured through the «Refinement» relationship. In addition to tracing LLRs
to HLRs, the proﬁle enables to trace LLRs speciﬁed using the «LowLevelRequirement»
stereotype to LLRs speciﬁed by UML design diagrams.
Figure 5.27 shows the traceability of LLR-44 to the design elements that are responsible for its
implementation. LLR-44 is implemented by the waitForHydraulicPressure operation.
The complete behavior of the function is captured by the waitForHydraulicPressure
state machine, however only a subset of elements of the state machine actually implements
LLR-44. These elements are the Running and the VerifyWithinOperatingRange
states, the transition named else that results from the choice present in the Running state.
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Figure 5.26 Reﬁnement of HLR-6 into LLR-44.
Figure 5.27 Elements of the waitForHydraulicPressure that statisfy LLR-44.
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5.2.5 Use case 4: Specifying veriﬁcation data
The activities of the software veriﬁcation process aim at assessing the outputs of the software
planning process, software development processes, and the software veriﬁcation process.
The software veriﬁcation process produces data that are a combination of reviews, analyses,
test cases and procedures. The proposed proﬁle enables the speciﬁcation of these data and
their traceability. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the traceability of veriﬁcation data to software
requirements and design. This is done using the veriﬁcation diagram and package deﬁned in the
proﬁle. The remaining of this section will provide examples of testing data that we were able to
produce within the scope of our work.
Consider the HLR-12 shown in Figure 5.28. HLR-12 states that once 2 seconds have elapsed
since the general EV Actuation Command controllable variable was set to Open and the overall
value of the Hydraulic Circuit Pressure monitorable variables is still less than 30,000 kPa,
the LGCS shall detect a failure of the general hydraulic electro-valve. Figure 5.29 shows the
speciﬁcation of a normal range test case that veriﬁes that HLR-12 is satisﬁed. This speciﬁcation
describes the test purpose, pass and fail criterion and its expected result. In order for the test to
be successful, the LGCS shall detect a failure of the system when the pressure remains below
30 kPa once 2 seconds have elapsed since the general electro valve have been set to open.
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Figure 5.28 An example of high-level requirement.
Figure 5.29 Speciﬁcation of a normal range test case intended to verify the correct
behavior of the LGCS as speciﬁed in HLR-12.
Figure 5.30 depicts a test procedure for executing the test case provided in Figure 5.29. This
procedure describes the environment in which the testing occurs. In this case, the test case shall
be executed in a black box environment. The LGCS is running in its normal mode of operation
(i.e. the system is not in a failed mode) and the received (simulated) pressure of the hydraulic
circuit shall never be superieur or equal to 30 kPa. The LGCS shall receive a new desired gear
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position input value through the pilot interface manager. Because we did not execute the LGCS
test cases, we do not have any test results. This is illustrated in Figure 5.30 by the fact that
testResult is null.
Figure 5.30 Test procedure associated to the normal
range test case provided in Figure 5.29.
Figure 5.31 provides the speciﬁcation of a review that targets LLR-44 following objective 6.3.2.a.
The objective is to verify that low-level requirements comply with high-level requirements,
and that a rationale is provided for each derived LLR. In this case, LLR-44 is not a derived
requirement so the review does not need to check that a rationale is provided for this LLR. In
order to perform this review, no additional testing data is required as the review analyses the
compliance between the LLR and the HLRs being reﬁned. The result of the review is that the
behavior speciﬁed by LLR-44 complies with the high-level requirements it reﬁnes (HLR-6 and
HLR-12).
173
Figure 5.31 Speciﬁcation of a review as deﬁned by objective 6.3.2.a along with the
result of the conducted review.
5.3 Discussion
We used the DO-178C proﬁle to model the LGCS case study. We were able to specify all
the high-level and low-level requirements. We also used the proﬁle to model the software
architecture and low-level requirements in the form of standard UML diagrams. Using the
proﬁle, we were also able to specify veriﬁcation data. Finally, the proﬁle helped specifying the
traceability links between HLRs and LLRs, between HLRs and software architecture. Moreover
the proﬁle enables to trace the speciﬁcation of LLRs to their speciﬁcation as UML standard
design diagrams.
Nevertheless, we could not demonstrate some of the features of our proﬁle because of the limits
of the LGCS case study. In fact, the LGCS speciﬁcation does not describe test cases nor test
procedures and results. So to illustrate the usefulness of the proﬁle, we have deﬁned test cases
and procedures ourselves. As a result, we could not demonstrate the use of certain concepts of
the proﬁle.
The usefulness of the proposed proﬁle depends on the extent to which it complies with/and
supports DO-178C guidelines. In this context, our conceptual model of DO-178C was validated
by industrial partners through a number of working sessions. The proﬁle will be deployed in an
industrial context in the near future.
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The usability of our proﬁle may also be limited by the modeling environment (Papyrus) that
we used to implement it. During our work with Papyrus, we realized that some UML concepts
are not supported. For instance Papyrus does not enable to specify the UML elements "signal
reception" and "receive signal" that are used in both state machine and activity diagram.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Contributions
In this thesis, we proposed a model-driven approach to support the process of collecting evidence
required for software certiﬁcation in the context of airborne systems that must be compliant
with DO-178C. In particular, we built a domain-speciﬁc modeling language that supports the
speciﬁcation of such evidence. Thus this language provides modeling constructs that match
DO-178C concepts and vocabulary. We implemented our language as a UML proﬁle (DO178C
proﬁle) using an open-source modeling tool (Papyrus).
Our DO178C proﬁle has the following unique features:
• The proﬁle provides means to specify the software life cycle data in terms of planning
models and integrates these models with those produced by the software development and
veriﬁcation processes.
• The proﬁle provides means to specify the objectives and activities to be performed through-
out the software life cycle depending on the targeted assurance level and applied DO-178C
supplements. This is enforced through a number of constraints that apply to the planning
models being created by the user. Each constraint is deﬁned for a speciﬁc assurance level and
may result from a speciﬁc DO-178C supplement. Moreover, the proﬁle provides templates
that generate automatically objectives and activities depending on the assurance level chosen
by the user.
• The proﬁle provides means for modeling software requirements and veriﬁcation data as
required by DO-178C. As the proﬁle extends the UML meta-model, software requirements
and veriﬁcation data is integrated with design models. Furthermore, the proﬁle supports the
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traceability between requirements and veriﬁcation data, and between high-level and low
level requirements.
We performed a case study to assess our proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, we used the proﬁle to model a
realistic example of airborne software (i.e. the LGCS). We illustrated its usage through four
particular use cases. These use cases helped demonstrate the usability and usefulness of the
proﬁle. However the demonstration of the features of the proﬁle was limited to those required
by the LGCS.
Future works
In the near future, we plan to reﬁne our proﬁle and extend our work as follows:
• Reﬁning the proﬁle through more case studies: First we plan to use our proﬁle to model
another available airborne software (i.e. The Helicopter Flight Control System (Mathworks,
2017)). Second, we plan to deploy the proﬁle in an industrial context. This will help reﬁne
the modeling constructs and constraints deﬁned by the proﬁle.
• Implementing and integrating the proﬁle within a commercial tool: Our current imple-
mentation of the proﬁle is based on the Papyrus open-source tool. Papyrus does not support
some UML concepts which impacts the usability and usefulness of our proﬁle. Since our
industrial partners are using the IBM modeling suite, we plan to implement the proﬁle within
the Rational Rhapsody tool.
• Automating the generation of (part of) the documentation required for certiﬁcation:
Since our proﬁle provides means to specify software life cycle data, our work can be
extended to automatically generate documents from these data. Indeed, to get certiﬁed,
an applicant must submit such documents to the certifying authorities. Currently, these
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documents are still manually written and a large effort is required to collect all of the required
information which result from different processes and activities. We believe that our proﬁle
can be used to generate, if not entirely, sections of these documents. To do so, we plan to
explore existing model query engines such as VIATRA (Viatra, 2017).

APPENDIX I
OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SOFTWARE PLANNING PROCESS
Figure-A I-1 Objectives and activities of the Software Planning Process. Extracted from
RTCA (2011a).

APPENDIX II
THE TYPE PACKAGE OF THE DO-178C PROFILE
The UML proﬁle for DO-178C introduces types that are used to specify the values of the
attributes of the stereotypes. The Types package contains the deﬁnition of each of these types.
The following sections provide the description of each of these types and their possible values.
1. ActivityState
Enumeration Name Description Values
ActivityState Speciﬁes the possible values for an activity
state.
• InProgress
• Pending
• Terminated
• UnderReview
• UnderCorrection
2. ActivityType
Enumeration Name Description Values
ActivityType Provides the list of all activi-
ties deﬁned by the standard.
For the complete list of activities
refer to the standard.
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3. ControlCategory
Enumeration Name Description Values
ControlCategory Control categories are conﬁguration manage-
ment controls that are placed on the software
life cycle data. There exist two categories that
deﬁne the activities of the software conﬁgu-
ration management process to be applied to
software life cycle data.
• ControlCategory1
• ControlCategory2
4. DO178CSupplement
Enumeration Name Description Values
DO178CSupplement Supplements represent the set
of documents that are to be
used together with DO-178C
guidelines when speciﬁc tech-
nologies are used.
• DO330: Represents the DO-330
Software Tool Qualiﬁcation Con-
siderations supplement.
• DO331: Represents the DO-331
Model-Based Development and
Veriﬁcation Supplement to DO-
178C and DO-278A.
• DO332: Represents the DO-332
Object-Oriented Technology and
Related Techniques Supplement to
DO-178C and DO-278A.
• DO333: Represents the DO-333
Formal Methods Supplement to
DO-178C and DO-278A.
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5. ObjectiveType
Enumeration Name Description Values
ObjectiveType Provides the list of all of the
objectives deﬁned by the stan-
dard.
For the complete list of objectives
refer to the standard.
6. ProcessType
Enumeration Name Description Values
ProcessType Provides the list of DO-178C
deﬁned processes that consti-
tute the software life cycle.
• SoftwarePlanningProcess
• SoftwareRequirementsProcess
• SoftwareDesignProcess
• SoftwareCodingProcess
• IntegrationProcess
• SoftwareVeriﬁcationProcess
• SoftwareConﬁgurationManage-
mentProcess
• SoftwareQualityAssurancePro-
cess
• CertiﬁcationLiaisonProcess
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7. RationaleType
Enumeration Name Description Values
RationaleType This is used to specify the
type of a rationale for speciﬁc
use cases as required by DO-
178C.
• Undeﬁned: A rationale without
type.
• DesignDetailJustiﬁcation: A ra-
tionale used to justify why a high-
level requirement contains design
details.
• VeriﬁcationDetailJustiﬁcation: A
rationale used to justify why a high-
level requirement contains veriﬁca-
tion details.
8. RequirementStatus
Enumeration Name Description Values
RequirementState Deﬁnes the possible values for
the status of a requirement.
• Unreviewed
• Reviewed&Incorrect
• Reviewed&Accepted
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9. RequirementType
Enumeration Name Description Values
RequirementType This is used to identify the
kind of the requirement being
speciﬁed.
• FunctionalRequirement
• OperationalRequirement
• InterfaceRequirement
• PerformanceRequirement
• SecurityRequirement
• MaintenanceRequirement
• CertiﬁcationRequirement
• AdditionalRequirement
• SafetyRelatedRequirement
• ComponentResuseRequirement
10. SoftwareLevel
Enumeration Name Description Values
SoftwareLevel This is used to specify the crit-
icality level of the software to
be produced.
• SoftwareLevelA
• SoftwareLevelB
• SoftwareLevelC
• SoftwareLevelD
• SoftwareLevelE
186
11. SoftwareLifeCycleDataType
Enumeration Name Description Values
SoftwareLifeCycleData-
Type
This is used to specify the
kind of data that a software
life cycle data represents.
• PlanForSoftwareAspectsOfCerti-
ﬁcation
• SoftwareDevelopmentPlan
• SoftwareVeriﬁcationPlan
• SoftwareConﬁgurationManage-
mentPlan
• SoftwareQualityAssurancePlan
• SoftwareRequirementsStandards
• SoftwareDesignStandards
• SoftwareCodeStandards
• SoftwareRequirementsData
• SoftwareDesignDescription
• SourceCode
• ExecutableObjectCode
• SoftwareVeriﬁcationCasesAnd-
Procedures
• SoftwareVeriﬁcationResults
• SoftwareLifeCycleEnvironment-
ConﬁgurationIndex
• SoftwareConﬁgurationIndex
• ProblemReports
• SoftwareConﬁgurationManage-
mentRecords
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Enumeration Name Description Values
SoftwareLifeCycleData-
Type
• SoftwareQualityAssuranceRe-
cords
• SoftwareAccomplishmentSum-
mary
• TraceData
• ParameterDataItemFile
• SoftwareModelStandards
• Feedback
12. TestingMethod
Enumeration Name Description Values
TestingMethod Deﬁnes the kind of the test to
be carried out.
•HardwareSoftwareIntegrationTes-
ting
• SoftwareIntegrationTesting
• LowLevelTesting
13. TestTarget
Enumeration Name Description Values
TestTarget Speciﬁes the possible values
for the targeted environment
for the execution of a test case.
• TargetComputer
• TargetComputerEmulator
• HostComputerSimulator
14. TestType
Enumeration Name Description Values
TestType Speciﬁes the possible values
for the type of a test case.
• NormalRangeTestCase
• RobustnessTestCase
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15. Verdict
Enumeration Name Description Values
Verdict A verdict is used to specify the
conclusions of evaluating the
results obtained from the exe-
cution of a test.
The verdict enumeration is
consistent with the deﬁnition
of a verdict as deﬁned by the
UML testing proﬁle (UTP)
(OMG, 2014).
• None: The test case, test proce-
dure, review or analysis have not
yet been executed.
• Pass: The test results are consis-
tent with the expected results.
• Inconclusive: The evaluation of
the test results is inconclusive, i.e
we cannot state whether the test
fails or passes.
• Fail: The test results are not con-
sistent with the expected results.
• Error: There have been an error
within the testing environment.
APPENDIX III
INTEGRATING THE DO-178C PROFILE WITHIN PAPYRUS
1. Identifying and registering the proﬁle
The org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c plug-in is in charge of the registration of a static
proﬁle within Papyrus. Static proﬁles are generated from dynamic proﬁles (the proﬁle model).
In order to build this plug-in, we have followed the instructions contained in the complete step
by step guide provided in the papyrus user guide related to static proﬁle generation 1.
This plug-in uses the following extension points provided by the Papyrus environment:
• org.eclipse.emf.ecore.generated_package: This extension point registers a generated Ecore
package against a namespace URI within EMF’s global package registry. This extension is
automatically added to the plug-in and its content is ﬁlled for each of the proﬁle’s packages
during the generation of the proﬁle’s source code from the generator model. Figure III-1
provides an example of the ﬁlled extension point DO178C package containing our proﬁle
deﬁnition.
• org.eclipse.emf.ecore.uri_mapping This extension point is used to deﬁne mappings that
are to be applied by the environment’s default URI converter when normalizing URIs. In
simpler words, this extension point is used to deﬁne aliases for ﬁle paths which eases paths
manipulation. Figure III-2 provides an example of how we have deﬁned the URI mapping
for plug-ins.
• org.eclipse.uml2.uml.generated_package: This extension point registers the location of
a UML package against the namespace URI of its generated Ecore representation. The
location attribute requires the ID of the proﬁle that is found within the profile.uml ﬁle.
1 "Generating Static Proﬁles": http://help.eclipse.org/neon/index.jsp?topic=%2Forg.eclipse.papyrus.uml.
diagram.proﬁle.doc%2Ftarget%2Fgenerated-eclipse-help%2Fusers%2FgeneratingStaticProﬁles.
html
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Figure-A III-1 DO178C generated package registration
Figure-A III-2 DO178C proﬁle URI mapping.
The ID location in the ﬁle is shown on Figure III-3. Figure III-4 provides an example of
how we have ﬁlled the required inputs for the extension.
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Figure-A III-3 The proﬁle ID within the proﬁle.uml ﬁle.
Figure-A III-4 Generated package registration.
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2. Extending the Papyrus UI
The org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.ui plug-in is in charge of the deﬁnition of multiple
contributions to the user interface. These elements are deﬁned through the following extension
points:
• org.eclipse.papyrus.uml.extensionpoints.UMLProﬁle: This extension point registers UML
proﬁles packaged as plug-ins into the Papyrus modeling tool. Complete guidance to ﬁll-in
the information related to this extension is provided in the papyrus user guide related to
static proﬁle generation2. Figure III-5 shows an example of the ﬁlled data for the registration
of our proﬁle.
Figure-A III-5 UML proﬁle registration.
• org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.ui.papyrusDiagram This extension point is used to register new
diagram editors within Papyrus. Papyrus uses the term diagram category to categorize
domain models. Papyrus supports UML and UML Proﬁles as default domZain models.
Papyrus also uses the term diagram kind to refer to the specialization of the diagram editor
2 "Generating Static Proﬁles": http://help.eclipse.org/neon/index.jsp?topic=%2Forg.eclipse.papyrus.uml.
diagram.proﬁle.doc%2Ftarget%2Fgenerated-eclipse-help%2Fusers%2FgeneratingStaticProﬁles.
html
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for a certain domain, for example the UML class diagram is a diagram kind for the UML
domain category. A diagram kind belongs to only one diagram category whereas a diagram
category may contain multiple diagram kinds. Figures III-6 and III-7 respectively show
the diagram category page and the diagram kind page when creating a new model within
Papyrus. Figure III-8 shows how we have ﬁlled the extension for our DO178C diagram
category.
Figure-A III-6 Papyrus diagram category selection wizard.
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Figure-A III-7 Papyrus diagram kind selection wizard.
Figure-A III-8 Diagram category registration.
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• org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.properties.contexts: This extension point allows the registration
of property view pages for the stereotypes of the proﬁle. Papyrus provides a tool for the
automatic generation of these view pages. However some of the generated pages might have
to be manually edited in order to display the correct graphical element to manipulate certain
properties. The Papyrus documentation provides a complete guide for the customization and
the generation of property view pages3. Figure III-9 shows how we have ﬁlled the extension
for the registration of property view pages.
Figure-A III-9 Property view pages plug-in registration.
3. Extending Papyrus to include the proﬁle templates
The org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.wizard plug-in is in charge of the registration of
template models within the papyrus environment. A template is a base model that is copied into
a newly created UML model. Such templates are created by the designer of the proﬁle. In our
case, the templates contain predeﬁned models for the deﬁnition of the software life cycle for
each software level.
This plug-in uses the following extension point provided by the Papyrus environment:
3 "Properties view customization": http://help.eclipse.org/neon/index.jsp?topic=%2Forg.eclipse.papyrus.
views.properties.doc%2Ftarget%2Fgenerated-eclipse-help%2Fproperties-view.html
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• org.eclipse.papyrus.uml.diagram.wizards.templates: This extension point registers UML2
model templates that can be used when creating a new model. The content of the template
is then copied into the newly created model. Figure III-10 shows the customized Papyrus
wizard for selecting a template. In this case, we deﬁned four templates, one for each software
level. Figure III-11 shows the extension point as ﬁlled for our needs.
Figure-A III-10 Customized Papyrus wizard
for the selection of a template.
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Figure-A III-11 UML model template registration.
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4. Extending Papyrus to include the Proﬁle viewpoint
Viewpoints allow the customization and specialization of the user experience by modifying the
tool graphical aspects that related to new diagrams and tables. Viewpoints offer the possibility
to:
• constrain the available diagrams and tables to particular users
• implement new kind of diagrams that deﬁne custom names, icons, ﬁgures, palettes, and
custom display of stereotypes through CSS style sheets for domain speciﬁc views
The org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.viewpoint plug-in is in charge of registering
the DO178C viewpoint to which we will be able to later attach the proﬁle’s diagrams. The
plug-in uses the following extension point:
• org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.viewpoints.policy.custom: This extension allows to register a new
viewpoint conﬁguration. The deﬁnition of a viewpoint conﬁguration is realized either by a
conﬁguration or contribution. The differences between the two are explained in the Papyrus
user guide related to viewpoint4. The only detail that was not explained in the aforemen-
tioned guide was that we had to load within our conﬁguration ﬁle the following conﬁguration
ﬁle deﬁned by the environment platform:/plugin/org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.viewpoints.policy/-
builtin/default.conﬁguration. This does not deﬁne new diagram kind. It only deﬁnes the new
view category for DO178C to which we later attach our diagrams. Figure III-12 provides an
example of how we have ﬁlled the required input for the extension point using a contribution.
4 "Viewpoints in Papyrus": http://help.eclipse.org/neon/topic/org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.viewpoints.doc/
target/generated-eclipse-help/viewpoints.html?cp=66_1_0
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Figure-A III-12 DO178C viewpoint registration.
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5. Extending Papyrus to include the proﬁle’s diagrams
These plug-ins are in charge of the deﬁnition of new diagrams for DO178C. We have created
one plug-in for each newly deﬁned diagram. The list of plug-ins is the following:
• org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.diagram.requirement
• org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.diagram.lifecycle
• org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.diagram.verification
Each of these plug-ins are built following the same steps. These plug-ins deﬁne new diagram
kinds along with their custom palettes, icons, CSS style sheet. These plug-ins are created using
the instructions related to viewpoint customization5.
• org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.viewpoints.policy.custom: This extension registers a diagram con-
ﬁguration ﬁle. A conﬁguration ﬁle deﬁnes various properties of the diagram such as the
palette deﬁnition ﬁle, the CSS style sheet for the diagram, and the elements of the UML
metamodel that can be represented in the diagram. Figure III-13 shows the extension done
to include the software life cycle diagram. The diagram conﬁguration needs to access
properties deﬁned in the conﬁguration ﬁle of the viewpoint plug-in in order to attach the
diagram deﬁnition to the DO178 viewpoint.
5 "Viewpoints in Papyrus": http://help.eclipse.org/neon/topic/org.eclipse.papyrus.infra.viewpoints.doc/
target/generated-eclipse-help/viewpoints.html?cp=66_1_0
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Figure-A III-13 Diagram conﬁguration ﬁle registration.
202
6. Extending Papyrus to include the proﬁle constraints
The org.eclipse.papyrus.do178c.validation plug-in is in charge of registering
the constraints deﬁned by our proﬁle in order to verify the well-formedness rules of a model
that uses our proﬁle. This plug-in uses the EMF validation framework and simply registers all
of our constraints that have been written using the Java programming language.
Papyrus provides a tool that help in the generation of a skeleton for this plug-in. This tool, called
Papyrus DSML validation, needs to be installed ﬁrst. Figure III-14 shows the Papyrus wizard to
install this tool. This tool generates additional code that is used by the validation framework to
identify the context of model elements parsed by the validation engine in order to assess which
constraint applies to the element being veriﬁed by the engine.
Figure-A III-14
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Because our constraints are not deﬁned within the proﬁle model, we had to add manually every
information related to each constraint (the Java classes implementing the constraints, and the
model element to which the constraint applies).
This plug-in uses the following extension points:
• org.eclipse.emf.validation.constraintProviders: This extension point enables the registration
of the constraint as a Java class. An example of how the extension point was used is provided
in Figure III-15. It speciﬁes the constraint severity, its language, the class that implements
the constraint, and its ID used by the tool for registration.
Figure-A III-15 Example of the constraintProvider deﬁnition.
• org.eclipse.emf.validation.constraintBindings This extension point is in charge of registering
for each execution context the applicable constraints. An example of how the extension
point was used is provided in Figure III-16.
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Figure-A III-16 Example of the constraintBinding deﬁnition.
205
7. Modiﬁcations made to Papyrus plug-ins
To customize Papyrus behavior, we modiﬁed the org.eclipse.papyrus.uml.diagram
.wizards plug-in. We modiﬁed this wizard in order to be able to disable the selection of a
diagram kind when a software life cycle template model has been selected as shown on Figure
III-17, where the diagram selecting has been greyed out once a template has been selected.
Figure-A III-17 Disabled diagram kind selection when a template is selected.
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